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The purpose of this thesis is to improve the
representation of chemical warfare in the U.S. Army's
Vector-in-Commander (VIC) Combat Simulation. Pursuant to
that aim, a chemical operations modeling overview was
conducted to identify thesis candidate areas. The results
of that overview are presented in Figure 1-1. The candidate
area advanced by this thesis is the model development of
decision logic for the employment of chemical artillery
munitions
.
This effort uses two methodologies previously explored
in theses at the Naval Postgraduate School. First, the
Generalized Value System (GVS) developed by Kilmer [Ref . 1]
provided a basis for determining the value or worth of
entities on the battlefield. Second, the Planning Process
by Fletcher [Ref. 2] demonstrated the use of GVS for making
tactical decisions.
B - GOALS
This thesis has three goals. The first goal is an
immediately usable improvement to VIC in the form of a
product which the "model owner", U.S. Army TRADOC Analysis
Command—White Sands Missile Range (TRAC-WSMR) , can use to
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Figure 1-1. Chemical Modeling Overview
write the code necessary for incorporation into VIC.
Chapter III addresses this first goal. The second goal is
to illustrate how GVS can be used for making artillery
munition decisions within VIC. This second goal stems from
the current consideration being given to incorporating GVS
into VIC. Chapter IV addresses this second goal. The third
goal is to produce a stand alone document which identifies,
explains, and contrasts the theoretical "underpinnings" of
the Vector-In-Commander (VIC) decision methodology and the
Generalized Value System (GVS) decision methodology.
Appendix A addresses this third and last goal.
C. PROCEDURES FOR ACHIEVING GOALS
VIC decision methodology is an example of "current
state decision making" . Current state decision making is
used in almost all combat models. Decisions made by the
model are based on the situation when the decision is made.
No attempt is made to predict future conditions. Since VIC
is designed to have its decision logic expanded as required,
the procedures for achieving the first goal of this thesis
will follow those described in the Vector—In-Commander (VIC)
Combat Simul at ion DATA INPUT AND METHODOLOGY MANUAL [Re f
.
33.
In contrast, the GVS decision methodology is "future
state decision making". This methodology is being developed
as part of the Air Land Advanced Research Model (ALARM) at
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) [Ref . 1 & 2] . Each
decision made by a GVS model is based on the predicted
results of the available courses of action, not on the
situation at the time the decision is made. The procedure
for illustrating GVS ' s applicability for making artillery
munition decisions will involve adapting the GVS methodology
developed by Kilmer [Ref. 1] and used by Fletcher [Ref. 2].
D. SCOPE
The decision logic for the employment of chemical
artillery munitions is interrelated with the more general
question of decision logic for artillery munitions as a
whole. For this reason, where possible, the overall scope
of this thesis addresses the decision logic for those
artillery munitions explicitly represented in VIC.
The scope of the VIC improvement goal within this thesis
is limited to a generic decision logic applicable to both
Red and Blue forces. It is anticipated that the differences
in Red force doctrine will eventually cause separate Blue
and Red decision logic to be developed.
The scope of the GVS methodology demonstration goal
includes both Red and Blue forces. Separate treatment is
not required.
The scope of the theoretical "underpinnings" goal covers
Game Theory, Multiattribute Decision Theory, Utility Theory,
and Forcasting Theory.
II. BACKGROUND
A. CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND EFFECTS MODELING
The United States* unilateral national policy concerning
chemical weapons is "no first use". When that policy went
into effect, chemical weapons had not been used to any
significant degree since World War I. Steps were even
instigated to disband the U.S. Army Chemical Corps.
Understandably, chemical weapons and effects modeling had a
very low priority during this time. As the military
modeling community developed land combat models, chemical
weapons and effects were not included.
However, at about the time when the Chemical Corps
disbandment was almost complete, it was discovered that
chemical weapons were being used extensively in Southeast
Asia. Somewhat later, it was determined that the U.S.S.R.
was using chemical weapons routinely against the
"Afghanistan rebels". It was also determined that the
U.S.S.R force structure and doctrine in the European theater
called for the routine and massive use of chemical weapons.
This put the U.S. in a position of playing "catch up".
Very slowly, the Chemical Corps has been, and still
continues to be, rebuilt. Doctrine on chemical operations
has been in a continual state of change as the threat was
balanced against the U.S. capabilities and weaknesses.
However, even as this "catch up" progressed, very little was
done to update land combat models to include chemical
weapons and effects.
This serious shortcoming still persists today. There is
currently no model which can simulate force on force
engagements with a realistic portrayal of chemical weapons
and effects. Without such a model, the Army's ability to
evaluate the impact of doctrine and chemical equipment
changes is dangerously limited.
B. VIC
1 . General
The Army Model Improvement Program (AMIP) consists
of a set of combat models which the Army is committed to
maintaining and improving. This set consists of a complete
hierarchy of combat models from the very high resolution
level to the very aggregated level. Each succeedingly more
aggregated level in the hierarchy is "fed" data by the less
aggregated-higher resolution model below it. The importance
of VIC lies in its unique position as the corps level model
in the AMIP. As such, VIC is the feeder model for FORCEM,
FORCEM being the theater level model in the AMIP.
The following is a brief description of VIC from the
VIC Executive Summary [Ref . 4:p. 1]
:
The Vector-in-Commander (VIC) model is a two-sided
deterministic simulation of combat in a combined arms
environment representing land and air forces at the US
Army corps level with a commensurate enemy force in a
mid-intensity battle. The model is designed to provide
a balanced representation of major force elements in a
tactical campaign of a US Army corps operating in the
field in a theater of operations.
VIC became the subject of this thesis because its
chemical module has long been identified as requiring the
attention of analysts who are also specialists in chemical
operations. However, VIC consists of approximately 1
million bytes of computer code (in Simscript II. 5, which is
not normally taught or used at NPS) and nearly 12 million
bytes of data. This large a learning curve prohibits changes
to VIC to occur within the scope of a single thesis.
2 . Decision Methodology
VIC uses a decision table structure for making
internal (i.e., "no man in the loop") decisions as a
scenario proceeds. This structure is a set of conditions
and a set of actions built into a complex set of
"if . . . then. . . " statements in the form of a table. For
example, consider VIC Decision Table Dl [REF. 5] presented
in Figure II-l.
Dl RED FLOT RGT INACTIVE 3 2 4
C19 Y Y //**IS THIS A 1ST ECH UNIT?
C46 Y - //**HAS SYNCH TIME AT LAST LOC BEEN MET?
C651 . - //**HAVE WE SIMULATED >... DAYS?
A14 X - //**ATTACK
A1005 X - //**ACCESS DECISION TABLE 5
Figure II-l. VIC Decision Table Dl [REF. 5]
A Red regiment on the forward line of troops with an
inactive status will cause Table Dl to be accessed. The
table conditions are then examined columnwise until a column
is found that matches the current situation. The actions in
that column are then executed and the table is exited.
Specifically above, if the entity is a first echelon
unit and the entity meets the synchronization time at its
last location and the model has simulated greater than 0.0
days, then the regiment's status will be changed to attack
(i.e., ordered to attack) and Decision Table D5 RED FLOT RGT
ATTACK will be accessed.
An exception to the usual column-match and exit
routine is when action A999 CONTINUE SCAN is one of the
actions in the matched column. In that case, the columnwise
search will continue with possibly more actions executed if
another match is made. If no column is matched, the table
is exited with no new actions initiated.
The version of VIC used for this thesis had 92
decision tables constructed from 238 conditions and 143
actions. Unfortunately for anyone attempting to "read"
these tables, the comment lines included in the above
example are not present in the standard table listing, but
were in separate condition and action listings. This gives
the task of learning to read VIC decision tables a very long
and tedious learning curve.
3. Chemical Representation
The chemical module currently resident in VIC is
severely limited by many serious shortcomings. The module
was authored in a span of a six week Naval Postgraduate
School "Experience Tour" as a last minute attempt to include
chemical operations in a major study then underway. The
original author, CPT John Van Grouw, despite his not being a
chemical officer, provided an excellent basic structure upon
which those who follow can build and improve.
This thesis will partially address one of VIC '
s
shortcomings, the absence of chemical operations from the
VIC decision logic. Currently, decision tables cannot
initiate chemical attacks nor can decision tables be
affected by chemical conditions. To realistically portray
chemical operations, this disconnect must be corrected.
C. THE GENERALIZED VALUE SYSTEM (GVS)
The GVS methodology basically consists of a way of
calculating the combined "value" of all the entities in a
sector for each side. This value is a function of the
availability of different type entities in the sector, those
entity's capabilities, their assigned missions, and their
proximity in time to performing those assigned missions.
The sector situation is represented by a pair of "value
curves"— a Blue value-vs-time curve and a Red value-vs-time
curve
.
The value curves described above extend from the current
time out to the end of the commander's "decision horizon",
defined in hours according to the level of command. Within
this thesis, a combat sector is defined as "infeasible" if
the commander's value curve falls below the enemy's value
curve any time during the decision horizon. The commander's
goal is to always be feasible. Once infeasible, the
commander must compare the courses of action available to
him and decide which to implement.
In the optimal GVS decision method, the commander would
calculate a revised pair of value curves for each available
course of action. Then, using one or more measures of
effectiveness, one course of action is selected for
implementation. If no available course of action meets the
selected measure (s) of effectiveness, a request for
additional resources is made to the next level of command
and the process continues at that level.
Because calculating a pair of value curves for every
available course of action is usually computationally
prohibitive, a sub-optimal decision method is to compute a
pair of value curves for N courses of action and select the
"best" by applying the selected measure (s) of effectiveness.
Within this thesis, two measures of effectiveness will
be used. The first measure of effectiveness is feasibility
restoration. That is, if by varying the time of execution,
10
a course of action cannot restore feasibility, that course
of action is eliminated. The second measure of
effectiveness is the difference between the two value curves
at the end of the decision horizon. The course of action
with the greatest difference in value at the end of the
decision horizon is the optimum course of action.
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III. MUNITION SELECTION WITH VIC DECISION LOGIC
A. WORKING DEFINITIONS
The decision of when to use chemical munitions is
actually a decision of when to fire chemical munitions in
place of other munitions. It follows that any decision
apparatus which decides on chemical munition use must also
consider non-chemical munitions. Hence, discussion on the
subject must be able to distinguish differences between
various munitions. The following definitions are presented
to facilitate that discussion:
Standard effects: suppression, neutralization, and
destruction (VIC battle damage criteria) [Ref . 3:p. 4-
6], all of which are subsets of one type of effect:
attrition.
Standard munition: attrition munitions.
Special effects: an important tactical effect which
does not fit the standard effects of artillery target
damage criteria. Examples: delaying, degrading,
channelizing, and/or disrupting.
Special munition: a munition, not necessarily
limited to artillery, which produces one or more special
effects. This munition may or may not also produce
standard effects.
Munition Category: a set of munitions with similar
effect (s)
.
B. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT VIC ARTILLERY MODULE
Considering the above definitions, VIC explicitly




- Non-persistent chemical munitions




The VIC Artillery Module (AT) uses fourteen data input
"segments". Each of these segments inputs the data
necessary for representing a specific aspect of the
artillery activities simulated by VIC. Of these fourteen,
the following five require consideration for the
representation of a munitions selection process:
- AT-THREE-ZERO Munition Data
- AT-FOUR Special Munition "Mission" Data
- AT-FIVE Number of Rounds to Service
- AT-SIX Preferred Munition Type
- AT-SEVEN Target Priority
These five segments have the following representation of
special munitions [Ref. 3]:
1 . AT-THREE-ZERO
Types of data common to all munition types are input
in this segment. Data peculiar to special munitions are
input in their respective modules.
2 . AT-FOUR
Special munitions are defined into "missions" in
this segment; standard munitions are never defined into
missions. The main distinction defined here is which
mission type is to be used against which unit prototype.
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3. AT-FIVE
Special munition mission types are equated with
target classes in this segment. As such, this segment
defines
:
For special munitions— the number of rounds required
to service a mission type.
For standard munitions— the number of rounds
required to service a particular target class.
Since AT-FOUR defines which mission type is used
against which unit prototype, this segment does define the
number of special munition rounds required to service a
particular unit prototype.
4. AT-SIX
Special munition mission types are also equated with
target classes in this segment. As such, this segment:
For special munitions--def ines which special
munition is used for each mission type.
For standard munitions—ranks standard munitions in
the order of preference to be used against each target
class
.
The overall purpose of this segment is munition
choice given target class. Since mission types are equated
with target classes, there is no attempt to model the choice
between standard and special munitions.
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5. AT-SEVEN
Special munition mission types are equated with unit
prototypes in this segment. Thus, special munition mission
types are prioritized with (i.e., compete against) unit
prototypes for the priority of engagement as determined in a
firing unit's target list. In other words, the fact that it
is a particular special munition mission, not what the
target is or the effect on that target, is the criteria by
which all artillery units prioritize their target lists when
dealing with special munitions.
C. PROBLEMS IN THE CURRENT VIC ARTILLERY MODULE
The preceding discussion illustrates two major
shortcomings. The first is a model structure that does not
explicitly choose between special munitions and standard
munitions. The second is a model structure which
prioritizes target lists by munition type for special
munitions on one hand and by target class for standard
munitions on the other. On the battlefield, target priority
is a function of target importance (i.e., target class); it
is not a function of the munition type as is used with
special munitions.
D. CHANGES TO THE CURRENT VIC ARTILLERY MODULE
Because of the way segments AT-THREE through AT-SEVEN
build upon each other, changes must start at AT-THREE and be
15
carried through AT-SEVEN. The required changes are treated
in two parts. First, they are identified and discussed in
the following section under the heading of General Changes.
Second, the explicit details of what, where, and how to
effect the changes are covered under the heading of Detailed
Changes. As discussed in the introduction, the level of
detail does not include computer code changes. It is
intended that the level of detail given will be sufficient
to enable a VIC programmer to make the necessary computer
code changes
.
1 . General Changes
a . AT-THREE-ZERO
Add "MUNITION CATEGORY" as an input for each
munition type, so that segment AT-SIX can rank munitions
within the same category.
b . AT-FOUR
Remove the "mission" concept and convert all
data to munition data. The use of special munition missions
is a complication detrimental to modeling the choice between
munition categories.
c. AT-FIVE
With AT-FOUR changed as indicated above and
missions no longer in use, this segment will take on the
same meaning for both special and standard munitions (i.e.,
the number of rounds to service a particular target class).
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d. AT-SIX
The choice between standard and special
munitions cannot be made by the method currently used with
standard munitions (i.e., a simple rank ordering of special
and standard munitions together for each target class).
This would be equivalent to ranking "apples and oranges".
This would also result in special munitions being selected
only when higher ranked munitions could not be used.
However, ranking munitions which have similar
effects (i.e., within munition categories) is reasonable.
Standard munitions attrite the target and can be ranked by
which provides the greater attrition level. The same
applies to each of the other munition categories. To effect
this change, this segment should input the "within munition
category" rankings for each target unit prototype.
Given this "within munition category" ranking, a
method is needed by which VIC can model the choice between
categories. Within VIC, the logical choice is to modify
current decision tables and/or develop new decision table (s)
which decide munition category based on the tactical
situation. This will correct the first major shortcoming
discussed earlier.
f . AT-SEVEN
With the changes listed above implemented, this
segment should now prioritize target lists strictly on the
17
basis of target unit prototypes. This result corrects the
second major shortcoming discussed earlier.
2. Detailed Changes
Some of following change descriptions include
definitions, wordage , and format found in the Vector—In-
Commander (VIC) Combat Simulation DATA INPUT AND METHODOLOGY
MANUAL [Ref. 3]. Quotes and offset are purposely not used




Add CATEGORY OF MUNITION (after "NAME OF
MUNITION"). This value categorizes each munition by it's
effects. The following represents the key for the
categories considered by this thesis:
Standard munitions
1 Non-persistent chemical munitions





First, redefine "mission" to mean any artillery
fire mission (i.e., the servicing of one target during an
artillery allocation cycle) . Using this definition, this
segment should input the following:
18
NUMBER OF SPECIAL MUNITION TYPES--The number of
artillery special munition types.
(iterate for each special munition type)
NAME OF SPECIAL MUNITION--A short name to
identify the munition/ordnance used in the database. This
name must match the name in AT-THREE-ZERO, in the respective
special munition module, and in logistics module (if
logistics is being played)
.
ENEMY OFFSET—Distance, from the front of the
target unit's leading elements to the mission's aim point.
If this is a chemical munition (category 1 or 2) , this is
the distance from the target's center of mass to the
mission's aim point. A "tie-in" with wind direction should
eventually be included in this offset distance.
FRIENDLY OFFSET—This is the same as ENEMY
OFFSET, but is measured from the friendly unit's leading
elements
.
MISSION WINDOW FOR OFFENSIVE USE OF THIS
MUNITION— If the using side is on the offensive and if their
artillery cannot get the mission delivered by the time this
window time has passed, the mission will be dropped.
MISSION WINDOW FOR DEFENSIVE USE OF THIS
MUNITION—This is the same as MISSION WINDOW FOR OFFENSIVE
USE OF THIS MUNITION, except that it applies when the using
side is on the defense.
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The iteration on GROUND UNIT PROTOTYPE, as the
current segment requires, is no longer needed in this
segment. The decision of which category of munition, and of
which munition within that category, is decided using
segment AT-SIX inputs and the decision tables.
c. AT-FIVE
No format changes are required, but the number
of special munitions rounds required to service each target
class is needed. Generating this database is beyond the
scope of this thesis.
d. AT-SIX
First, an "AT-SIX" segment for each munition
category is needed to preference rank munitions within their
respective categories. The format currently used in AT-SIX
requires no changes. The following segments would suffice
for the categories being considered by this thesis:
AT-SIX-ZERO Standard munitions
AT-SIX-ONE Non-persistent chemical munitions




Next, with all munitions separated into
categories and preference ranked within those categories,
the choice of munition is required (i.e., which category
should service different tactical situations) . To do this
requires modification of the current decision tables and/or
the development of new decision table(s).
20
(1) Decision Table Modification Candidates.
Decision Tables deemed likely modification candidates are
listed in TABLE III-l. Candidates were selected by
including all tables which currently cause at least one
special munition to be requested. Added to this list were
any remaining tables that appeared to play a direct role in
combat operations. In all, 35 decision tables were
selected
.
(2) Examination of Current Conditions and
Actions. Examination of the current 238 conditions revealed
that there are no conditions directly related to special
munitions. Examination of the current 143 actions found the
following actions directly related to special munitions:
A54 Request Smoke for self screening
A55 Request Smoke for enemy screening
A56 Request FASCAM for self protection
A57 Request FASCAM for enemy blocking
A58 Request FASCAM for reinforcement blocking
The existence of actions requesting smoke
and FASCAM caused two modeling options to become apparent.
One option was to maintain the current structure and create
actions for chemical and jammer munitions similar to those
for smoke and FASCAM, inserting these actions into the
relevant decision tables. The second option was to create
an action which accesses a special munition decision table
when conditions indicate a special munition might be
21
TABLE III-l DECISION TABLE MODIFICATION CANDIDATES
Table Table Title Action I Action Title
01 RED F10T RGT INACTIVE NONE
02 RED FLOT RGT DEFEND A54
02 RED FLOT RGT DEFEND A55
D3 RED FLOT RGT WITHDRAWING A54
D4 RED FLOT RGT PURSUE A57
D5 RED FLOT RGT ATTACK NONE
07 RED FLOT RGT HOVE TO CONTACT A55
D7.5 RED FLOT RGT HASTY DEFEND A54
D7.5 RED FLOT RGT HASTY DEFEND A55
D9 RED FLOT REGT ASSAULT NONE
oie RED FLOT ADVANCE GUARD NONE
Oil RED 2ND ECH RGT OF ANY DIV A55
012 RED 2ND ECH R6T PASSING THRU A55
016 RED FLOT OIV HO A58
017 RED FLOT DIV HOVE & COHMT 2ND ECH RGTS A57
021 RED 1ST ECH RGT OF 2ND ECH DIV PASSING THRU A55
031 1ST ECH RGT OF 1ST ECH DIV OF 2ND ECH ARMY PASSING THRU A55
042 RED OnG 1ST ECH BDE DEFEND A54
042 RED GflG 1ST EC* BDE DEFEND A55
043 RED OMG 1ST ECH BDE UITHORAUING A54
044 RED ORG 1ST ECH BDE PURSUE A57
045 RED OflG 1ST ECH BDE ATTACK NONE
046 RED ORG ADVANCE 6UAR0 NONE
047 RED 0*G 2ND ECH BDE A55
048 RED Otto 2ND ECH BDE PASSING THRU A55
049 RED OMS 1ST ECH BDE MOV: TO CONTACT A55
050 RED OttG CORPS HO A58
051 RED OttG COR°S HOVE S COMMIT 2ND ECH BOES A57
054 RED OflG ASSAULT NONE
0162 BLUE MBA BATTALION DEFEND A54
0102 BLUE MBA BATTALION DEFEND A56
0103 BLUE MBA BATTALION UITHORAUING A54
0104 BLUE MBA BATTALION PURSUE NONE
0105 BLUE NBA BATTALION ATTACK NONE
0106 BLUE ISA BATTALION DELAY A54
D106 BLUE MBA BATTALION DELAY A56
D107 BLUE BttA BATTALION MOVEHENT TO CONTACT NONE
0199 BLUE M8A BATTALION ASSAULT NONE
0110 BLUE CFA HANEUVER UNIT A54
0110 BLUE CFA MANEUVER UNIT A56
0117 BLUE MBA BDE CONTROLLING BATTALIONS A55
D117 BLUE ABA BDE CONTROLLING BATTALIONS A57
SflOKE FOR SELF SCREENING
SMOKE FOR ENEMY SCREENING
SflOKE FOR SELF SCREENING
FASCAfl FOR ENEMY BL0CKIN6
SflOKE FOR ENEMY SCREENING
SMOKE FOR SELF SCREENING
SMOKE FOR ENEMY SCREENING
SMOKE FOR ENEMY SCREENING
SMOKE FOR ENEMY SCREENING
FASCAM FOR REINFORCEMENT BLOCKING
FASCAM FOR ENEMY BLOCKING
SflOKE FOR ENEMY SCREENING
SMOKE FOR ENEMY SCREENING
SflOKE FOR SELF SCREENING
SflOKE FOR ENEMY SCREENING
SMOKE FOR SELF SCREENING
FASCAM FOR ENEMY BLOCKING
SflOKE FOR ENEMY SCREENING
SMOKE FOR ENEMY SCREENING
SflOKE FOR ENE'Y SCREENING
FASCAM FOR REINFORCEMENT BLOCKING
FASCAM FOR ENEMY BLOCKING
SflOKE FOR SELF SCREENING
FASCAM FOR SEL PROTECTION
SMOKE FOR SELF SCREENING
SflOKE FOR SELF SCREENING
FASCAM FOR SEL PROTECTION
SflOKE FOR SELF SCREENING
FASCAM FOR SEL PROTECTION
SflOKE FOR ENEMY SCREENING
FASCAM FOR ENEMY BLOCKING
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appropriate. This special munition decision table would
decide munition types for given situations. The second
approach is favored because of its easier maintainability.
Should munition selection criteria changes be required or
new special munitions be added, only the table itself need
be changed.
( 3 ) Examination of the Decision Table
Modification Candidates. To build the special munitions
decision table it is necessary to determine the required
conditions and actions. Some of the conditions are
currently already in VIC. To find these, an examination of
the 35 previously selected tables was conducted, table by
table, noting any relevant current conditions and any
required new conditions. During the examination, any
necessary modifications for each table were also determined.
The results of this examination are presented in Appendix B.
More useful is a consolidation of the information in
Appendix B presented in TABLE III-2, where each condition is
listed once with its description, answer/thresholds, and any
links with other conditions. These links were from the
tables themselves or were implied by the table's resulting
actions
.
(4) The Special Munition Decision Table. In
addition to the current conditions presented in TABLE III-2,
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TABLE III-2. DECISION TABLE EXAMINATION RESULTS
CI ABREV CONDITION TITLE ANSW LINKS
C! IS THIS UNIT ENGAGED? Y oC19 oC402 OC403 oC405 OC414
Cll RNG IN 101 TO NEAREST OPPONENT (...? .3
C19 IS THIS A FIRST ECH UNIT? Y oCl, K5S K613
C37 IS THE CFA BATTLE OVER? Y &C415
CM APPROACH REINFRCWT IN TA 5 (... KM FROfl RED FLOT? 15 &C19 K613
C74 IS THERE AN ADV GRD FOR THIS UNIT? Y &C75 SC203
C75 UNIT'S ADV GRD FORCE RATIO (R/B) >=...? 3 &C74 &2fc3
C2e3 UNIT (... KM BEHIND LEADING UNIT? 5 4C74 &C75
C402 COflBAT STATUS = ADVANCE UNOPPOSED? Y oCl
C4e3 COTBAT STATUS = FM DEL ATK? Y oCl OC404 OC405 OC414 oC409 oC410 oCill OC412 OC413
C404 COMBAT STATUS = PURSUE? Y oCl OC403 OC405 oC409 oC418 oC411 OC412 OC413
C6.e5 COMSAT STATUS FNT COUNTER ATK? Y oCl oC403 oC404 oC409 oC412 oCill OC412 OC413 OC414
C406 COMBAT STATUS = ASSUALT Y oC410 oC414
C40^ COflBAT STATUS = FNT DEL DEF? Y oC403 oC404 C405 0C411 OC412 OC413
C410 COflBAT STATUS = HOVEHENT TO CONTACT? Y oCl OC403 oC404 oC40S OC40& oC414
C411 COflBAT STATUS = FNT HASTY DEF? Y OC403 OC404 oC405 OC409 oC412 OC413
C412 COnE-AT STATUS = FL" HASTY DEF? Y oC403 oC40i oC405 OC409 oC411 OC413
C413 COflBAT STATUS = DELAY I ACT DEM? Y OC403 OC404 oC405 oC409 oC411 oC412
C414 COMBAT STATUS = UITHORAJ OPPOSED^ Y oCl OC403 oC405 oC40fc oC410
C415 COflBAT STATUS - WITHDRAW UNCPPOSED^ Y (by itself J, SC37
C6C2 IS THIS AN INF UNIT? Y
C613 TANK, MECH INF, AIRBORNE, OR CAV UNIT? Y &C19 &CS8
KEY: Y - Means Logical [and*, i.e. both conditions Bust be let.
V - Means Logical "or", i.e. either condition Bust be «t.
24
development of the special munition decision table required
some new conditions. Specifically:
C700 HAS THE TARGET UNIT'S SIDE USED CHEMICALS? (Y/N)
C701 DOES THIS UNIT HAVE CHEMICAL RELEASE? (Y/N)
C702 IS THE REQUESTING UNIT IN MOPP 3 OR MOPP 4? (Y/N)
C703 IS THE TARGET UNIT IN MOPP 3 OR MOPP 4? (Y/N)
C704 UNIT'S DEFENSIVE POSITION STATUS = DEFENSIVE? (Y/N
Some new actions were also needed. First,
to keep all special munitions actions grouped together,
actions A54 through A58 became:
A701 REQUEST SMOKE FOR SELF SCREENING
A702 REQUEST SMOKE FOR ENEMY SCREENING
A7 3 REQUEST FASCAM FOR SELF PROTECTION
A704 REQUEST FASCAM FOR ENEMY BLOCKING
A705 REQUEST FASCAM FOR REINFORCEMENT BLOCKING
Secondly, the following actions were added:
A700 ACCESS D200, SPECIAL MUNITION DECISION TABLE
A706 REQUEST NON-PERSISTENT CHEMICAL ATTACK
A707 REQUEST PERSISTENT CHEMICAL ATTACK
A708 REQUEST JAMMER EMPLACEMENT
A7 09 USE STANDARD MUNITIONS ONLY
A710 REQUEST CHEMICAL RELEASE
With the above actions and conditions, it is
now possible to build an "empty" special munitions decision
table. Figure III-l presents this empty table. Next it is
necessary to develop the columnwise "situations" in order to
"fill in" the table. This situation development was
performed by translating the doctrine for the employment of
different munition categories into general guidelines as a
25
No. Situation CONDITION/ACTION TITLE
1111111112 2 2 2
1 234 56 7 8 9 e 1 234 56 7 898 1 2
CI IS UNIT ENGAGED (DIRECT FIRE)?
C1B IS RANGE IN KM TO NEAREST OPPONENT >=...?
Cll IS RANGE IN KM TO NEAREST OPPONENT (...?
C19 IS THIS A FIRST ECH UNIT?
C37 IS THE CFA BATTLE OVER?
C58 IS AN APPROACHING REINFORCEMENT IN TA 5 (... Kfl FROM RED FLOT?
C74 IS THERE AN ADVANCE GUARD FOR THIS UNIT?
C75 IS THIS UNIT'S ADVANCE GUARD'S FORCE RATIO (R/B) )=...?
C284 IS THIS UNIT > ... Kfl BEHIND LEADING UNIT?
C402 IS THIS UNIT'S COMBAT STATUS = ADVANCE UNOPPOSED?
C403 IS THIS UNIT'S COttBAT STATUS = FNT DELIBERATE ATTACK?
C404 IS THIS UNIT'S COnSAT STATUS = PURSUE
C485 IS THIS UNIT'S COflBAT STATUS = FRONTAL COUNTER ATTACK?
C406 IS THIS UNIT'S COMBAT STATUS - ASSUALT'
C409 IS THIS UNIT'S COMBAT STATUS = FNT DELIBERATE DEF?
C410 IS THIS UNIT'S C0M8AT STATUS = MOVEMENT TO CONTACT?
C411 IS THIS UNIT'S COMBAT STATUS = FRONTAL HASTY DEFENSE?
C412 IS THIS UNIT'S COMBAT STATUS = FLANK HASTY DEFENSE?
C413 IS THIS UNIT'S COMBAT STATUS = DELAY (ACTIVE DEFENSE)?
C414 IS THIS UNIT'S COMBAT STATUS = WITHDRAW OPPOSED?
C415 IS THIS UNIT'S COMBAT STATUS = UITHDRAU UNOPPOSED?
C6e2 IS THIS AN INFANTRY UNIT?
C613 - IS THIS A TANK HECH INFANTRY AIRBORNE OR CAV UNIT?
C708 HAS THE TARGET UNIT'S SIDE USED CHEMICALS?
C701 DOES THIS UNIT HAVE CHEMICAL RELEASE?
C7«2 13 THIS UNIT IN MOP? 3 OR MCFP 4?
C703 IS THE TARGET UNIT IN MOPP3 OR M0PP4?
C704 IS THIS UNIT'S DEF POSITION STATUS = DEFENSIVE?
A701 REQUEST IMMEDIATE ARTY SMOKE FOR SELF SCREENING
A782 REQUEST IMMEDIATE ARTY SMOKE FOR ENEMY SCREENING
A7e3 REOUEST IMMEDIATE FASCAM FOR SELF PROTECTION
A704 REQUEST IMMEDIATE FASCAM FOR ENEMY BLOCKING
A785 REQUEST IMMEDIA T E FASCA* FOR REINFORCEMENT BLOCKING
A?06 REQUEST IMMEDIATE ARTY NON-PERSISTENT CHEMICAL ATTACK
A?07 REQUEST IMMEDIATE ARTY PERSISTENT CHEMICAL ATTACK
A708 - REQUEST IMMEDIATE ARTY JAMMER EMPLACEMENT
A709 USE STANDARD MUNITIONS ONLY
A710 REQUEST CHEMICAL RELEASE
A999 CONTINUE SCAN
Figure III-l. Empty Special Munition Decision Table
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function of the conditions included in the empty table.
Such guidelines were alluded to in the VIC Executive Summary
as "tactical decision rules" [Ref . 4
: pp . 3,5].
Unfortunately, the VIC documentation does not include a
definition or listing of these tactical decision rules.
Figure III-2 presents the completed special
munition decision table. Excess columns and unused
conditions have been removed. The specific numbers used are
estimates or were obtained directly from similar
applications of the same conditions in the current decision
tables. The row for action A708 for jammer emplacement was
left empty because no tactical decision rules for jammer
munitions were found during the course of this thesis.
The tactical decision rules used to develop
the situations can be better understood by referring to the
decision flowchart presented in Figure III-3. The flowchart
was used to develop 16 "related" situations, specifically
situations 7 through 22. As the flowchart implies, these
situations are related in the sense that the same guestions
were asked to determine which munition should be used. Six
additional situations were developed based on specific
situations. Appendix C discusses and explains all 22
situations explicitly.
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No. Situation CONDITION/ACTION TITLE
11111111112 2 2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2
CI Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y IS UNIT ENGAGED (DIRECT FIRE)?
C10 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 IS RANGE IN KM TO NEAREST OPPONENT >=...?
Cll .333333333 IS RANGE IN Kfl TO NEAREST OPPONENT <...?
CS8 - - 15 15 15 APPROACHING REINFORCEMENT IN TA & (... Kfl FROM RED FLOT?
C204 - IS THIS UNIT >= ... KM BEHIND LEADING UNIT?
Cm N N Y Y - - - - N N Y Y - - IS THIS UNIT'S COMBAT STATUS = PURSUE?
C414 Y Y Y Y IS THIS UNIT'S COMBAT STATUS = WITHDRAW OPPOSED?
C708 Y HAS THE TAR6ET UNIT'S SIDE USED CHEMICALS?
C701 N - Y Y - - Y - Y - Y - Y - Y - Y - Y - Y - DOES THIS UNIT HAVE CHEMICAL RELEASE?
C702 - - Y Y - - Y - Y - Y - Y - Y - Y - Y - Y - IS THIS UNIT IN HOPP 3 OR MOPP 4?
C703 - - N N - - N - N - N - N - N - N - N - N - IS THE TARGET UNIT IN MOPP3 OR MOPP4?
C704 - - N Y - - Y - Y Y N - N - Y - Y Y N - N - IS THIS UNIT'S DEF POSITION STATUS = DEFENSIVE?
A701 X X - - X X - - X X - - X X - - REQUEST IMMEDIATE AR TY SMOKE FOR SELF SCREENING
A702 X X - - X X - - X X REQUEST IMMEDIATE ARTY STOKE FOR ENEMY SCREENING
A703 XXXX----XXXX---- REOUEST IMMEDIATE FASCAM FOR SELF PROTECTION
A704 XX X X - - REOUEST IMMEDIATE FASCAM FOR ENEMY BLOCKING
A705 - - X X X REOUEST IMMEDIATE FASCAM FOR REINFORCEMENT BLOCKING
A706 - - - X X - X X - X - REOUEST IMMEDIATE ARTY NON-PERSISTENT CHEMICAL ATTACK
A707 - - X - - - X - X X - X REOUEST IMMEDIATE ARTY PERSISTENT CHEMICAL ATTACK
A708 REOUEST IMMEDIATE ARTY JAMMER EMPLACEMENT
A709 - X - - - X USE STANDARD MUNITIONS ONLY
A710 X REOUEST CHEMICAL RELEASE
A999 X - X X X CONTINUE SCAN





























































SP-FASCAM SEL? PROTECTING FASCAM
EB-FASCAM ENEr Y BLOCKING FASCAM
SS-SMOKE SELF SCREENING SMOKE
ES-SMOKE ENEMY SCREENING SMOKE
Figure III-3 Situation Flowchart
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e. AT- SEVEN
With the changes listed above implemented, this
segment should not require any changes.
Figure III-2 represents the finale of the
accomplishment of the first goal of this thesis, an
immediately usable improvement to VIC in the form of a
product which can be used to write the code necessary for
incorporation. This does not mean to imply that this
product is perfect; but rather, it is an improvement to VIC
which must be tested and adjusted according to the results
it produces.
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IV. MUNITION SELECTION WITH GVS
This section illustrates GVS ' s ability to accomplish the
same munition selection task accomplished by the Special
Munition Decision Table developed in Section III. However,
the decision criteria used by GVS are far more meaningful
and versatile than the tactical decision rules used in the
Special Munition Decision Table.
A. ESSENTIAL ASPECTS OF GVS
The following descriptions and definitions are intended
to give the reader sufficient understanding of GVS for the
application which follows. It is not intended to repeat the




"The value of an entity... is dependent on two
factors. First, value depends on how useful the entity
is... power being the measure of the usefulness of an entity.
Secondly, value depends on the supply or availability of the
entity." [Ref. 1, p. 26-27] This thesis considers the power
of the targeted unit and the power of the "benefitting" unit
to be the only measure required for analyzing the effects of
different munition types. This is functionally equivalent
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to Kilmer's [Ref. l:p. 27] assumption that, as a first order
approximation, value is equal to power.
b. Power
"There are two types of power that an entity
might (sic) have, inherent and/or derived. Inherent power
is the ability to disrupt, delay, or destroy the power of
enemy entities." [Ref. 1, p. 26-27] Because artillery
entities and the entities they support are inherent power
only entities, this thesis does not consider derived power.
c. Discounted Power
"The power of an entity. . .not ready to execute
its assigned mission is a discounted version of the power of
that entity if it was ready..." [Ref. 1, p. 26-27] Ready,
in this context, means the entity has arrived at a position
where it can begin its assigned mission.
2. Definitions
The following definitions are abridged from those
given by Kilmer [Ref. 1]
.
a. Entity—Zl
An entity is anything represented in the model
with power (and/or value). Notation: XI, X2 , ... for Blue;





An entity's state is the vector of an entity's
attributes at time t. Notation: SZl(t) is the state of Zl
at time t. The underline is used to denote this is a vector
of attributes. Attributes are of two types—quantitative
and qualitative. Quantitative attributes are the
number/amount of on-hand MTOE vehicles, equipment, supplies,
and personnel. Qualitative attributes describe the
condition of the entity. Examples of a qualitative
attribute are the mission of the entity or the chemical
contamination status of the entity.
c. Basic Inherent Power—BIP(Zl)
BIP(Zl) is Zl's inherent power at full MTOE
strength, ready to engage its most likely adversary. This
is the maximum power an entity can have. The units for
power, as initiated by Kilmer [Ref. 1], were "STAPOW". This
thesis further shortens this to "SPU" to mean Standard Power
Unit.
3. Equations
a. Adjusted Basic Inherent Power
This is the BIP after adjustment for the
entity's current state and assigned mission:
ABIP(SZKt)) = f (BIP(Zl) , SZl(t) )
(eqn IV-1)
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The nature and form of Equation IV-1 is a user
input. Crawford [Ref. 6] has begun the work on this task by-
developing a relationship between power and the on-hand
personnel, ammunition, vehicle, and POL levels.
b. Predicted Adjusted Basic Inherent Power
This is the ABIP predicted for time t > t p
(present time or time of prediction), given the entity's
state at tp. The form of the following equations was
proposed by Kilmer [Ref. 1] as a first order approximation:
PABIP(titp) = ABIP(tp) x exp[-LBA (t-t p ) ] t p <= t <= tA
(eqn IV-2)
PABIP(titp) = PABIP(tA !t p ) x exp[-LAA (t-tA ) ] t >= tA
(eqn IV-3)
Where: tA = Time of Arrival, the expected time
when the entity will arrive at a position where it can begin
its assigned mission; LBA = Before Arrival Decay Constant,
calculated from the Percent Change/Hour Before Arrival
(PBA ); LiAA = After Arrival Decay Constant, calculated from
the Percent Change/Hour After Arrival (PAA )
.
Some discussion on the rationale for Equations
IV-2 and IV-3 is necessary at this point. Both of these
equations represent an exponential decay of power with LBA
and LAA as the decay constants. The meaning of these
constants is critical to understanding GVS . This area of
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GVS still requires further research, but the following is
one way of considering these decay constants.
First, since it has already been stated that
both decay constants are a function of their respective
percent change/hour values, this relationship will be
derived. Suppose L is a generic decay constant and P is a
generic percent change per hour. The key to this derivation
lies in the fact that at time t p + 1 hour, a percent change
equal to P will occur, so PABIP = ABIP x (l-P/100). This
allows the ABIP to be canceled from both sides of the
equation. Thus, substituting t = t p + 1 and PABIP ( tp+1 !
t
p )
= ABIP(tp) x (l-P/100) into Equation IV-2 will yield the
following result:
PABIP(tltp) = ABIP(tp) x exp[-L(t-t p )
]
PABIP(tp+l!t p ) = ABIP(tp) x exp[-L(tp+l-t p )
]
ABIP(tp) x (l-P/100) = ABIP(tp) x exp[-L]
(l-P/100) = exp[-L]
ln(l-P/100) = ln(exp[-L])
==> ln(l-P/100) = -L
==> L = -ln(l-P/100)
(eqn IV-4)
Second, the meaning of PBA and PAA need to be
clarified. The power of an inherent power (i.e., combat)
entity changes over time even before arrival at the position
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where it begins its mission (i.e., engages the enemy with
its organic weapons). This change is due to: before
arrival supplies usage (Pbasu*) • before arrival supplies
replenishment (PbaSR^ ' before arrival noncombat personnel
attrition (?BANPA^ ' Derore arrival indirect fire personnel
attrition (PbAIPA* ' and before arrival personnel
replenishment (Pbapr^ • PBA ^- s a aggregation of all the
above before arrival percent changes:
P BA = " PBASU + PBASR " PBANPA " PBAIPA + PBAPR
(eqn IV-5)
Similarly, the change in power after arrival is
due to after arrival supplies usage (P^ASU^ > after arrival
supplies replenishment (P^ASR^ ' after arrival combat
personnel attrition < PAACPA^' after arrival indirect fire
personnel attrition (Paaipa^ ' an(^ after arrival personnel
replenishment ( pAAPR^* Like Pba' pAA ^ s also an aggregation
of the after arrival percent changes:
PAA = " PAASU + PAASR " PAACPA " PAAIPA + PAAPR
(eqn IV-6)
The bottom line is that percent changes/hour due
to these various effects can be translated into decay
constants which in turn are used for the calculation of
power as a function of time. The best form for Equations
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IV-2 and IV-3 have yet to be determined and is an area
requiring further research. The same is true of determining
the necessary components for the two aggregated percent
change/hour values, PgA and PAA - For the purposes of this
thesis, it is assumed that this data is available so the
corresponding decay constants, LBA and LAA, can be
calculated.
c. Situational Inherent Power (SIP)
This is the power at time t > t p , predicted at
time tp. For time t < tA , this implies the entity's power
is discounted. The equations for SIP, also proposed by
Kilmer [Ref . l:p. 39], are:
SlP(tltp) = PABIP(tA !t p ) x exp[-D(t A-t) ] <= t <= tA
(eqn IV-7)
t >= t A
= PABIP(tA !t p ) x exp[-LAA (t-t p ) ] t >= tA
(eqn IV-8)




Equation IV-7 is based on the assumption that
the power of an entity before it has arrived is the entity's
37
arrived power discounted exponentially. D is the
exponential discount constant. The equation for D, Equation
IV-9, follows from assigning an arbitrarily small fraction
of readiness, 0.05 in Equation IV-9, to an entity when, at
time t , that entity is just entering the opposing entity's
area of interest.
During the course of developing the example
which follows it became apparent that Equations IV-8 and IV-
9 apply only to moving entities. Once the entity is in
place and waiting for the approaching enemy, the SIP must be
calculated using Equations IV-2 and IV-3 with the stationary
entity's tA set equal to that of the moving entity.
4. General Case Example
At this point, an example will illustrate the
procedure for applying the above definitions . The procedure
is as follows:
Step 1: Calculate tA from the entity's distance to







Determine BIP (user input)
.
Calculate ABIP from Equation IV-1.
Calculate LBA using Equation IV-4 and PgA .
Calculate LAA using Equation IV-4 and PAA .
Calculate PABIP{tA lt p ) from Equation IV-2.
Calculate D from Equation IV-9 (required
only if Equations IV-7 and IV-8 are to be used in Step 8)
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Step 8: Calculate SIP from Equations IV-7 and IV-8
or from Equations IV-2 and IV-3 if the entity is in place
and waiting for the enemy.
The following example illustrates the use of GVS for
making comparisons between Red and Blue combat power. It is
not meant to be all-encompassing, but is intended to be a
simplified version of how VIC could use GVS. This example
is purposely patterned after Kilmer's example [Ref. l:p. 68-
95] . This example is presented from the point of view of a
Blue Tank Battalion Commander.
a. Scenario
A Blue Tank Battalion (XI) is defending a
specified area against an approaching Red Tank Regiment
(Yl) . The XI mission is to prevent Yl from advancing past
the current location of the XI rear boundary in the next 6
hours .
b. Initial Situation
XI is at full strength, has a BIP of 1000 SPU,
and is in prepared defensive positions waiting for Yl . Yl
is at full strength, has a BIP of 3600 SPU, entered the XI
area of interest at time t = -1, and is moving forward at a
constant speed.
c. The Yl SIP Curve
Step 1: Suppose that Yl has a distance and
expected speed which yields tA = 3 hours.
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Step 2: BIP(Yl) = 3600 SPU was given above.
Step 3: Next suppose that intelligence
estimates that Yl , at time t p = hours, has a complete
basic load, has the mission to attack XI, and that under
these conditions Eguation IV-1 estimates that the Yl ABIP is
100% of its BIP:
ABIP(tp) = (1.00) x 3600 SPU = 3600 SPU
Step 4: Continuing, the Yl PpA is estimated to
egual 3% per hour. From Eguation IV-2:
LBA = -ln[l-PBA ] = -ln[l-0.03] = 0.0304592 (1/Hour)
Step 5: Similarly, suppose the Yl PAA is
estimated to egual 10% per hour. From Eguation IV-2:
LAA = -ln[l-PA ] = -ln[l-0.10] = 0.1053605 (1/Hour)
Step 6: Substitute t = tA = 3 hours into






PABIP(tA !t p ) = ABIP(tp) x exp[-LBA (tA-t p )
]
= (3600 SPU) x exp[-0. 0304592(3-0)
]
= 3285 SPU
Step 7: From Eguation IV-9:
-In 0.05
D =





Step 8: The Yl SIP curve is then described
using Equations IV-7 and IV-8:
SlP(tltp) = PABIP(tA !t p ) x exp[-D(tA-t) ] t <= tA
= (3285 SPU) x exp[-0. 998577 (3-t) ] t <= 3
SlP(titp) = PABIP(tA] t p ) x exp[-LA (t-t p ) ] t >= tA
= (3285 SPU) x exp[-0. 1053605 (t-0) ] t >= 3
d. The XI SIP Curve
Step 1: With XI already in place, tA becomes
the time when the enemy will arrive, so tA = 3.
Step 2: BIP(Xl) = 1000 SPU was given above.
Step 3: Next suppose that XI, at time tp = 0,
has a complete basic load, has the mission to defend against
Yl at their current location until time t = 6 hours, and
that under these conditions Equation IV-1 estimates the XI
ABIP to be 100% of the BIP:
ABIP(tp) = (1.00) x 1000 SPU = 1000 SPU.
Step 4: Suppose the XI PBA is estimated to
equal 2% per hour. From Equation IV-2:
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LBA = -ln[l-PBA ] = -ln[l-0.02] = 0.0202027
Step 5: Similarly, suppose the XI PAA is
estimated to equal 8% per hour. From Equation IV-2:
LAA = -ln[l-PA ] = -ln[l-0.08] = 0.0833816
Step 6: Substitute t = tA = 3 hours into






PABIP(tA !t p ) = ABIP(tp) x exp[-LBA (Xl) (tA-t p )
]
= (1000 SPU) x exp[-0. 0202027 (3-0)
]
= 941 SPU
Step 7: Equation IV-9 is not appropriate since
XI is in place and waiting for Yl
.
Step 8: The XI SIP curve is then described
using Equations IV-2 and IV-3:
SlP(tltp) = ABIP(tp) x exp[-LBA ( t-tp)
]
t <= tA
= (1000 SPU) x exp[-LBA (t-t p ) ] t <= 3
SlP(titp) = PABIP(tA !t F ) x exp[-LA (t-tA ) ] t >= tA
= (941 SPU) x exp[-LA (t-tA ) t >= 3
Historically, the defending side has a
significant advantage over the attacker. This advantage is
generally considered to be on the order of three to one
against the attackers. For this reason, the SIP (XI) is
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multiplied by three. The resulting sector SIP curves are
given in Figure IV-1.
B. DECISION MAKING WITH GVS
1. Decision Timing
With GVS, answering the guestion of when to order
the execution of a course of action is accomplished via the
reiterative application of a "course of action evaluation
process". The easiest way to describe this process, and how
it determines when to make a decision, is from a "GVS
commander's" point of view. This is presented first for the
simplest case of all GVS decision methods, introduced
previously in Section II. C. The differences between the
simplest case and the general case, also introduced in
Section II. C, are then discussed. Last, the rationale on
the mechanics of the timing is explained.
a. Simplest Case
First, consider the N=l case of the sub-optimal
decision method described earlier in Section II. C. In this
case, courses of action are evaluated, one at a time, until
the first "feasibility restoring course of action" is found
and ordered executed (i.e., only the first measure of
effectiveness described in Section II. C is used).
The present time is t p = hours . The commander
sees in Figure IV-1 (described previously) that his XI
sector is infeasible, the Yl SIP curve goes above his XI SIP
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Y1 and X1 SIP Curves— General Case Example
2 4
Time (Hours)
Figure IV-1. SIP Curves—General Case Example
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curve before the end of his decision horizon of 6 hours.
The commander further sees that his infeasible time (i.e.,
when the sector goes infeasible) is tjNF = 2.9 hours.
Suppose the first available course of action he
wants to evaluate is an artillery "prosecution" which has a
"notification time" of t^-p = 1.5 hours. The notification
time is the minimum time between when the commander says "Do
it." (the decision time, t^) and when the subordinate
commander can say "We are in place and doing it." (the
execution time, t E )
.
Subtracting tNT = 1.5 hours from t INF = 2.9
hours, the commander calculates that the decision must be
made not later than time t = 1.4 hours. However, the
commander has a "decision cycle length" of C = 0.5 hours.
This decision cycle length defines the freguency of
"decision points", when the commander checks the sector
feasibility, evaluates courses of action, and makes
decisions
.
Between now and time t = 1.4 hours, the only
decision points occur at 0, 0.5, and 1.0 hours. Since
decisions occur only at decision points, the commander finds
the possible execution times by adding tjNF to the decision
points. This yields possible execution times of t E = 1.5,
2.0, and 2.5 hours.
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The comrr.ander then calculates revised sector SIP
curves including the artillery prosecution at 2.5 hours. If
these "t E = 2.5 curves" produce feasibility throughout the 6
hour decision horizon, the commander stops and waits until
the next decision point at time t = 0.5 hours. No decision
is required because the "t E = 2.5 curves" equate to a
decision time of tD = 1.0 hours. A decision time not equal
to the present time means no decision required.
However, if the "t E = 2.5 curves" do not produce
feasibility, the commander calculates the "t E = 2.0 curves".
If these are feasible, he stops and waits until time t = 0.5
hours. No decision is required because the "tE = 2.0
curves" equate to a decision time of t D = 0.5 hours. Again,
a decision time not equal to the present time means no
decision required.
However, if the "tE = 2.0 curves" do not show
feasibility, the commander calculates the "t E = 1.5 curves".
If these are feasible, he orders the artillery prosecution
course of action executed. A decision was required this
time because the t E = 1.5 curves equate to a decision time
of tD = hours. Thus, the only way the artillery
prosecution course of action can restore feasibility is for
the decision to be made now, because the decision time
equals the present time, tD = t p = .
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However, if the tg = 1.5 curves do not show
feasibility, the commander must reject the artillery
prosecution course of action since it failed to produce
feasibility at any of it's possible execution times. The
commander selects another available course of action and the
process starts over. If no available course of action can
restore feasibility, the commander requests additional
assets from the next higher commander.
b. General Case
Now consider the more general case where N>1
courses of action are evaluated simultaneously. The process
is the same as above, except for the following changes. The
process described above is applied to N courses of action.
The difference in the SIP curves, the second measure of
effectiveness described in Section II. C, is then applied to
those which met the feasibility restoration measure of
effectiveness. The course of action with the greatest
difference is the best course of action. If none of the N
courses of action can restore feasibility, a second set of N
courses of action is selected and the process starts over.
c. Rationale
In the course of action evaluation process
described above, starting at the latest execution time and
working downward is equivalent to the commander asking "Can
I get feasible later?" and "Can I withhold my uncommitted
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assets for now?". The commander asks these questions
because it is better to postpone a decision as long as the
sector can be made feasible by a later decision. This is
related to the air/land battlefield concept of agility.
Agility is affected in two ways by delaying a course
of action to the latest possible moment: (1) a course of
action executed at the latest possible moment will minimize
the enemy's time to react, thus minimizing enemy agility;
(2) if the situation chances, a greater need elsewhere may
develop for the entity whose commitment was delayed to the
latest possible moment, thus maximizing friendly agility.
2. Determining the Best Course of Action
To implement the course of action evaluation process
described above, a method is needed for recalculating the
sector SIP curves when a course of action commits more
friendly power to the sector.
a. Fletcher's Method [Ref . 2]
When more than one entity was committed to a
sector, Fletcher added the SIP curves of all the entities in
the sector. In this way, he was able to determine the best
course of action for tactical planning (i.e., which friendly
entity engages which enemy entity). Fletcher's artillery
assets were treated like any other entity; artillery SIP was
simply added to the sector total.
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Unfortunately, for artillery munition selection,
this approach is too aggregated. As used by Fletcher, the
SIP curve for an artillery entity is independent of the
munition category being used. The entire munition selection
process is implicitly rolled into the SIP. In order to make
munition selections using GVS , a more explicit method is
needed
.
One possible method is to use Fletcher's basic
method, but have different BIPs for the same artillery
entity, one for each munition category. Setting aside the
problem of determining these different BIPs, this method is
not an improvement; the munition with the greatest BIP would
simply be the munition of choice. In fact, this would make
the entire munition selection process a simple ranking by
BIP, which is essentially the current method used in VIC.
Another reason this method is unsatisfactory is that simply
having different BIPs does not take advantage of GVS '
s
ability to separately model attrition effects and delay
effects
.
b. The Parametric GVS Method
Consider the "real world" battlefield VIC is
trying to model. Focus on an artillery entity prosecuting a
single fire mission against a specific target entity, for a
specific benefitting entity. When the fire mission began,
Fletcher's method would add the power of the entire
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artillery entity to the benefitting entity and then subtract
it away a few moments later at the end of the fire mission.
This is unrealistic. The effects of that fire
mission do not just disappear after completion. What really
happens is the fire mission changes many of the target
entity attributes. In GVS, these entity attributes are
represented by the "parameters" that were used to calculate
the target entity's and, to a lessor extent, the benefitting
entity's SIP curves. Thus, one way to model a particular
munition category's unigue "munition effects" would be to
adjust the GVS parameters of every entity in the sector
accordingly
.
The next section will consider the relationships
between the various categories of munitions and the GVS
parameters
.
C. MUNITION EFFECTS AND GVS PARAMETERS
Recall from the working definitions and discussion in
Section III that VIC explicitly models the effects of six
categories of artillery munitions: HE, non-persistent
chemical, persistent chemical, FASCAM, smoke, and jammer.
Each of these is a separate category because of their unigue
tactical effects. The rest of this thesis will focus on




Non-persistent chemical is not considered because it is
a special case of a persistent chemical with a short
duration of effectiveness. As such, modeling non-persistent
chemical is similar to modeling a persistent chemical whose
effects can be "turned off" after a certain amount of time
has passed. Jammer munitions are excluded because, as in
the Special Munition Decision Table developed in Section
III, little information is available on the principles of
their tactical employment.
The remaining four categories have four major tactical
effects. TABLE IV-1 shows the categories and their
respective effects. Next, it is necessary to explicitly
identify the GVS parameters. Consider first the target
entity. The following discussion identifies which of these
parameters are affected by each of the four munition effects
and qualitatively how they change. TABLE IV-2 presents the
same information in a condensed format.
TABLE IV-1. ARTILLERY MUNITIONS CATEGORIES AND EFFECTS
Immediate Delayed Degradation Delay
Attrition Attrition
HE X





tA~will increase due to reactions to fire.
ABIP--will decrease due to losses.
Delayed Attrition:
PBA--will increase due to increased hazards.




tA--will increase because movement will slow to
react to, and compensate for, the increased hazards.






PAA--will increase because individual skills are
degraded and because ccmbat is more demanding of operator
skills.
Delay:
tA--will increase because the entity will have to
slow significantly, perhaps even stop, to deal with the
increased hazard.
Now consider the benefitting entity. Only two of its
GVS parameters, tA and PA , can be expected to change. In
the case where the benefitting entity is stationary before
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reaching the target entity, the benefitting entity uses the
target entity's tA and Equations IV-2 and IV-3 (rather than
IV-8 and IV-9) to determine its SIP curve. Thus, if the
target entity's tA changes, the benefitting entity's tA
TABLE IV-2. QUALITATIVE MUNITION EFFECTS ON GVS PARAMETERS






tA + NC + +
ABIP NC - NC
BA NC + + NC
NC + + NC
NC NC NC NC
NC NC NC NC
KEY: "+" Parameter increased.
"-" Parameter decreased.
"NC" No change in parameter
changes also. In all cases, the benefitting entity's PAA
will decrease because the target entity's ability to attriti
the benefitting entity will decrease.
TABLE IV-3 combines the information in TABLES III-l and
III-2, establishing the qualitative relationship between th<
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munitions categories and the GVS parameters. TABLE IV-3 was
derived by combining the columns of TABLE IV-2 as
appropriate for each munition according to TABLE IV-1 . The
multiple + /- signs indicate the number of ways in which that
munition category affects that GVS parameter; it does not
reflect any relationships between the munition categories.
TABLE IV-3. QUALITATIVE MUNITIONS CATEGORIES AND VIC
PARAMETERS RELATIONSHIPS




PBA NC ++ + +
NC ++ NC +
NC NC NC NC
NC NC NC NC
KEY: "+" Parameter increased.
"-" Parameter decreased.
"NC" No change in parameter
TABLE IV-3 establishes a new set of relationships that
the VIC model user must input. With that input, GVS can be
used to make munitions decisions in a manner similar to the
54
previous General Case Example. The next section illustrates
this process
.
D. EXAMPLE OF MUNITION DECISION MAKING WITH GVS
The following example illustrates the use of GVS for
making artillery munition decisions. As a continuation of
the previous example, this is not meant to be
all-encompassing, but is intended to be a simplified version
of how VIC could use GVS to model artillery munition
decisions
.
TABLE IV-3 listed the qualitative relationships between
the munition categories and the GVS parameters. To proceed
with the example, quantitative relationships are required.
TABLE IV-4 replaces TABLE IV-3 with quantitative
relationships for this example.
Also assumed for this example is the duration of the
effects given a single artillery prosecution. With a 6 hour
decision horizon, all effects were assumed to be permanent
once the artillery prosecution had been made.
The information required to answer the munition category
decision is now available. Recall the course of action
evaluation process described earlier and suppose the courses
of action now available to the XI commander are artillery
delivered HE, persistent chemical, FASCAM, or smoke. In
applying the evaluation process, the X2 commander calculates
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the sector SIP curves for each course of action. These are
presented in Figure IV-2.
Checking first for feasibility eliminates all but the HE
and Chemical munition categories. Looking at the difference
in the Red and Blue SIP curves at the end of the decision
horizon at time t = 6 hours indicates that the munition of
choice is chemical.
TABLE IV-4. EXAMPLE PERCENT CHANGES TO GVS PARAMETERS DUE
TO A SINGLE ARTILLERY PROSECUTION
HE Chemical FASCAM Smoke
Benefitting Entity:
PA -15 -20 -5 -10
Targeted Entity:
tA +10 +25 +35 +15
ABIP -15 -10 -5 NC
P BA NC +30 +30 +15
PA NC +3 5 NC +20
t p NC NC NC NC
t NC NC NC NC
The decision to use chemical munitions for this example
concludes the development and demonstration of the
Parametric GVS Method and represents the accomplishment of







V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has accomplished three goals. These were
(1) an improvement to the Vector-In-Commander Combat
Simulation, (2) the demonstration of GVS ' s usefulness with
respect to artillery munition selection, and (3) documenting
the theories behind the VIC and GVS decision methodologies.
1. Special Munition Decision Table
The Special Munition Decision Table and associated
changes presented in Section III represent an immediately
usable improvement for the explicit representation of the
artillery munition selection process in the Vector-In-
Commander Combat Simulation.
2. Parametric GVS Methodology
The Parametric Generalized Value System Methodology
developed in Section IV has been shown to be capable of
explicitly modeling artillery munitions decisions with all
the advantages of the Generalized Value System's future
state decision making capabilities. Further, this
methodology demonstrates that the Generalized Value System
method can be applied to a higher resolution of decision
modeling than previously attempted.
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3. VIC and GVS Decision Methodology Theory
Appendix A is a stand alone document which
identifies, explains, and compares the theoretical
"underpinnings" of the Vector-In-Commander (VIC) decision
methodology and the Generalized Value System (GVS) decision
methodology
.
4. Decision Table Versus GVS
The Parametric GVS Method has two major advantages
over the Special Munition Decision Table. One advantage is
that the Parametric GVS Method is grounded in data. As
mentioned earlier, Crawford [Ref. 6] has already gathered
and analyzed data concerning power as a function of
personnel, ammunition, vehicles, and POL. In contrast, the
Special Munition Decision Table must rely on tactical
decision rules. Another, perhaps egually important,
advantage is the way GVS makes decisions, by predicting the
future. In this way, GVS is attempting to model the real
world--the always predicting human brain.
B . RECOMMENDATIONS
As just mentioned, the weakness of the Special Munition
Decision Table lies in the tactical decision rules used in
the table's development. Acceptance of these rules requires
validation on two levels. First, the rules should be
reviewed by the U.S. Army Artillery School for their
doctrinal content. Second, a VIC analyst/programer should
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review and test the rules for their ability to interact with
the VIC rr.odel and for the results they produce when used in
the model.
The Parametric GVS Method has a similar weakness. The
data concerning a munition category's effects on the GVS
parameters is analogous to the Special Munition Decision
Table's tactical decision rules. The challenge here is to
extract the parameter changes from data already available
and/or get the data by conducting simulations; computer
simulations if possible, war game simulations it necessary.
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APPENDIX A
VIC AND GVS DECISION METHODOLOGY THEORY
This appendix is a stand alone document whose purpose is
to identify, explain, and contrast the theoretical
"underpinnings" of the Vector-In-Commander (VIC) decision
methodology and the Generalized Value System (GVS) decision
methodology. This effort was deemed particularly necessary
since none of the VIC references nor any of the GVS
references undertook this task. Four areas of theory will
be considered: Game Theory, Multiattribute Decision Theory,
Forcasting Theory, and Utility Theory. To maintain the
stand alone nature of this appendix, a review of the basic
elements of each theory is presented followed by the
explicit identification of their application to VIC and GVS.
The background section is included from the main body of the
thesis for the same reason.
A . BACKGROUND
1. VIC Background
VIC uses a decision table structure for making
decisions internally as a scenario proceeds. This structure
is a set of conditions and a set of actions built into a







of a table. For example, consider VIC Decision Table Dl
[REF. 5] presented in Figure A-l.
A Red regiment on the forward line of troops with an
inactive status will cause Table Dl to be accessed. The
table conditions are then examined columnwise until a column
is found that matches the current situation. The actions in
that column are then executed and the table is exited.
Dl RED FLOT RGT INACTIVE 3 2 4
Y //**IS THIS A 1ST ECH UNIT?
//**HAS SYNCH TIME AT LAST LOC BEEN MET?
//**HAVE WE SIMULATED >... DAYS?
//**ATTACK
//**ACCESS DECISION TABLE 5
Figure A-l. VIC Decision Table Dl [REF. 5]
Specifically above, if the entity is a first echelon
unit and the entity meets the synchronization time at its
last location and the model has simulated greater than 0.0
days, then the regiment's status will be changed to attack
(i.e., ordered to attack) and Decision Table D5 RED FLOT RGT
ATTACK will be accessed.
An exception to the usual column-match and exit
routine is when action A999 CONTINUE SCAN is one of the
actions in the matched column. In that case, the columnwise
search will continue with possibly more actions executed if
another match is made. If no column is matched, the table
is exited with no new actions initiated.
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The version of VIC used for this thesis had 92
decision tables constructed from 238 conditions and 143
actions. Unfortunately for anyone attempting to "read"
these tables , the comment lines included in the above
example are not present in the standard table listing, but
were in separate condition and action listings. This gives
the task of learning to read VIC decision tables a very long
and tedious learning curve.
2. GVS Background
a. General
The GVS methodology basically consists of a way
of calculating the combined "value" of all the entities in a
sector for each side. This value is a function of the
availability of different type entities in the sector, those
entity's capabilities, their assigned missions, and their
proximity in time to performing those assigned missions.
The sector situation is represented by a pair of "value
curves"— a Blue value-vs-time curve and a Red value-vs-time
curve
.
The value curves described above extend from the
current time out to the end of the commander's "decision
horizon", defined in hours according to the level of
command. Within this thesis, a combat sector is defined as
"infeasible" if the commander's value curve falls below the
enemy's value curve any time during the decision horizon.
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The commander's goal is to always be feasible. Once
infeasible, the commander must compare the courses of action
available to him and decide which to implement.
In the optimal GVS decision method, the
commander would calculate a revised pair of value curves for
each available course of action. Then, using one or more
measures of effectiveness, one course of action is selected
for implementation. If no available course of action meets
the selected measure (s) of effectiveness, a request for
additional resources is made to the next level of command
and the process continues at that level.
Because calculating a pair of value curves for
every available course of action is usually computationally
prohibitive, a sub-optimal decision method is to compute a
pair of value curves for N courses of action and select the
"best" by applying the selected measure (s) of effectiveness.
This appendix uses the same two measures of
effectiveness used within the main body of the thesis. The
first measure of effectiveness is feasibility restoration.
That is, if by varying the time of execution, a course of
action cannot restore feasibility, that course of action is
eliminated. The second measure of effectiveness is the
difference between the two value curves at the end of the
decision horizon. The course of action with the greatest
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difference in value at the end of the decision horizon is
the optimum or best course of action.
This appendix, also like the thesis main body,
assumes that the value of an entity is equal to its power.
Under this assumption, the word "power" is substituted for
the word "value" in the above general description. This
same assumption is made for the rest of this appendix.
b. GVS Equations
The following equations are those proposed by
Kilmer [Ref . 1] as a first order approximation for the
Situational Inherent Power (SIP) and were used in the main
body of this thesis. The equations are presented only so
their form can be analyzed for theoretical content; their
derivations and rationale can be found in the thesis main
body or in Kilmer's thesis [Ref. 1] . The equation numbers
are those used in the thesis main body. Equation IV-3 is
redundant to Equation IV-8 and is not included. The
equations are followed by definitions of the variable names
ABIP(t) = f (BIP,S(t)
)
(eqn IV-1)
PABIP(tA ',t p ) = ABIP(tp) x exp[-LBA (tA-t p )]
(eqn IV-2 at t = tA )
LAA = -ln[l-PAA ]
(eqn IV-4 with L = LAA and P = PAA )
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LBA = -ln[l-PBA ]
(eqn IV-4 with L = LBA and P = PBA )
PBA = " PBASU + PBASR " PBANPA " PBAIPA + PBAPR
(eqn IV-5)
PAA = " PAASU + PAASR " PAANPA " PAAIPA + PAAPR
(eqn IV- 6)
SlP(tltp) = PABIP(tA !t p ) x exp[-D(tA-t) ] <= t <= tA
(eqn IV-7)





t = time (Hr)
tQ = time of Entry into Enemy Area of Interest (Hr)
t p = time of Prediction or Present Time (Hr)
tA = time of Arrival {at mission start locationl (Hr)
(Hr = Hours)
ABIP = Adjusted Basic Inherent Power (SPU)
BIP = Basic Inherent Power (SPU)
PABIP = Predicted ABIP (SPU)
SIP = Situational Inherent Power (SPU)
(SPU = Standard Power Units)
S = State of Entity (Multiattribute Vector)
LBA = Loss Rate Decay Constant Before Arrival (1/Hr)
LAA = Loss Rate Decay Constant After Arrival (1/Hr)
D = Discount Constant (1/Hr)
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P BA = Percent Change/Hour Before Arrival
PAA = Percent Change/Hour After Arrival
PBASU = before Arrival Supplies Usage
PBASR = Before Arrival Supplies Replenishment
E>BANPA = Before Arrival Noncombat Personnel Attrition
PBAIPA = Before Arrival Indirect Fire Personnel Attrition
PBAPR = Before Arrival Personnel Replenishment
PAASU = After Arrival Supplies Usage
PAASR = After Arrival Supplies Replenishment
PAACPA = After Arrival Combat Personnel Attrition
PAAIPA = After Arrival Indirect Fire Personnel Attrition
PAAPR = After Arrival Personnel Replenishment
(All "P" variables have units of Fraction/Hr)
D = Discount Constant (1/Hr)
Within the above equations, the GVS "parameters"
identified in the thesis main body are the entity attributes
tQ , tp, tA , ABIP, PgA , and PAA - That is, given data for
these entity attributes, the entity's "SIP curve" can be
calculated. Figure A-2 is an example set of SIP curves
calculated and presented in the main body of this thesis.
B. GAME THEORY
1. Essential Elements of Game Theory
The following game theory definitions and
descriptions are abridged from a more detailed treatment
found in Decision Analysis by Gregory [Ref. 7].
a. General
The classic scenario of a simple game is the
situation in which there are two "players" (Player I and
Player II), one of which can be "Nature" itself. Player I
has a set of available alternatives (a^) from which one
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Y1 and X1 SIP Curves— General Case Example
2 4
Time (Hours)
Figure A-2. SIP Curves—General Case Example
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alternative must be chosen. Player II, likewise, has his
own set of available alternatives (b^) . For each pairing of
a Player I alternative and a Player II alternative, there is
a payoff (r^j) associated. All alternatives and their
respective payoffs are known to both players. TABLE A-l
illustrates the standard "payoff matrix" for the simple case
of each player having two alternatives.
TABLE A-l. SIMPLE TWO-PERSON GAME
Player II Alternatives
:




r ll r 12
a 2 r 12 r 22
Player I
There are two versions of this type of two person
game: the Two-Person Zero-Sum Game and the Two-Person Non-
Zero-Sum Game. The versions differ primarily on alternative
costs and on the type of prize being competed over. These
primary differences lead to secondary differences on the
number of payoff matrices reguired, how the payoff values
are defined, and on the extent that cooperation is a
possible strategy. These differences will be discussed and
identified as each version is presented. In addition, a
special case of the Two-Person Non-Zero-Sum Game, the Person
vs Nature Game, is presented.
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b. The Two-Person Zero-Sum Game
For the zero-sum version, there is an implicit
assumption that all alternatives for both players have a
zero cost. Also implied is that the players are competing
to completely divide some finite prize (i.e., one player's
loss is always the other player's gain). Because of the
prize's finite nature, only one payoff matrix is needed.
Each entry of this payoff matrix is the prize amount to be
gained by Player I, the balance going to Player II. Because
the prize is completely divided, there is never any rational
reason for the players to cooperate. TABLE A-2 illustrates
a zero-sum version in which the total prize is 12 units.
TABLE A-2. SIMPLE TWO-PERSON ZERO-SUM GAME
[Ref. 7:p. 57]
Player II Alternatives:
b l b 2




There are two strategies applicable to a two-
person game, "pure strategy" and "mixed strategy". The pure
strategy is actually a special case of the mixed strategy.
The pure strategy is quickly illustrated by
again looking at TABLE A-2. From Player I's point of view,
alternative a 2 "dominates" a-^ . To dominate means that a 2
gives a higher payoff than a± for all of Player II'
s
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alternatives. Likewise, from Player II's point of view, b^
dominates b 2 . This leads to Player I always using a 2 and
Player II always using b1 , hence this pure strategy leads to
a "saddle point" at (a 2 , b-j_) and results in 8 units going to
Player I and 4 units going to Player II. Any player who
departs from the saddle point will be worse off.
By contrast, there exist situations in which
there are no dominant alternatives. These situations
require a mixed strategy. Such a situation is presented in
TABLE A-3.
TABLE A-3. TWO-PERSON ZERO-SUM MIXED STRATEGY SITUATION
[Ref. 7:p. 58]
Player II Alternatives:
b l b 2
Player I a 1 12 4
Alternatives
:
a 2 8 12
A mixed strategy is applied by Player I deciding
to use a-j_ with probability p and a 2 with probability 1-p.
Similarly, Player II decides to use b^ with probability q
and b 2 with probability 1-q. These probability
distributions over each player's actions produces the joint
probability distribution described in TABLE A-4.
As a function of p and q, the joint probability
distribution produces the expected payoff surface. This
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TABLE A- 4. MIXED STRATEGY JOINT DISTRIBUTION
[Ref. 7:p. 61]
Player I Alternative al al a2 a2
Player II Alternative bl b2 bl b2
Probability pq p(l-q) (l-p)q (1-p) (1-q)
Payoff 12 4 8 12
three dimensional surface can be shown (graphically or using
calculus) to have a saddle point at (p=l/3, q=2/3) . As with
the pure strategy saddle point, the expected payoff will
decrease for any player who departs from the saddle point.
In general, any two-person game can be solved by
determining a probability distribution on the alternatives
based on expected payoffs. The uniqueness of this method is
that it does not help one player to know the other is using
this method. Further, any player who does not use this
method is placing himself at a disadvantage if his opponent
is
.
c. The Two-Person Non-Zero-Sum Game
The non-zero-sum version differs from the zero-
sum game in that there is an implicit assumption that each
alternative has a cost associated with it. These costs are
reflected by a reduction in the relevant payoffs. The non-
zero-sum version further differs in that the players are
competing for a prize whose characteristics prohibit it from
being divided between the two (i.e., one player's loss is
NOT necessarily the other player's gain).
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Because one player's loss is not the other
player's gain, one matrix cannot describe both player's
payoffs. Each player must have his own payoff matrix, the
entries of which are the prize amount to be gained by that
player. Also because of the prize's nature and because
alternative costs may be significant, there are situations
in which cooperation could be advantageous for both players
TABLES A-5 and A-6 illustrate such a situation.
TABLE A-5. TWO-PERSON NON-ZERO-SUM GAME
PLAYER 1 PAYOFF MATRIX
Player II Alternatives
:







TABLE A-6. TWO-PERSON NON-ZERO-SUM GAME
PLAYER II PAYOFF MATRIX
Player I Alternatives:
a l a 2
Player II b 1 8 11
Alternatives
b2 5 9
The pure and mixed strategies discussed for the
zero-sum game are also applicable to the non-zero-sum game,
except for the cooperation possibility. It can be seen
above that a-j_ dominates a2 and b^ dominates b2« Thus, the
saddle point is at (a^, b-j_) and results in 4 units going to
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Player I and 8 units going to Player II. However, if the
two players had cooperated by agreeing to choose a 2 and b 2 ,
Player I would have received 5 units and Player II would
have received 9 units.
d. The Person vs Nature Game
As stated previously, this game is a special
case of the two-person non-zero-sum game. Nature's quality
of "indifference" implies two simplifications. First,
Nature is assumed to move randomly among "states" rather
than choosing alternatives. This introduces the concept of
decision making under conditions of uncertainty. Second,
Nature's payoff matrix is assumed to be a matrix of all
zeros. These simplifications also change the strategy for
this type of game. First, Nature's state probability
distribution must be estimated. Second, the person chooses
the alternative with the greatest expected payoff.
This is demonstrated using the data in TABLE A-
7. The expected payoffs are: for a 1 , 0.4(4) + 0.6(11) =
8.2; and for a 2 , 0.4(5) + 0.6(9) = 7.4. Thus, in this
example, the person should always chose a^ .
This completes the Game Theory review. There
are many texts, including Gregory [Ref 6] and Moskowitz
[Ref. 7] used for this appendix, available on the subject
should the reader require a more complete treatment of the
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TABLE A-7. PERSON VS NATURE GAME
Nature's States:
s l s 2
State Probability: 0.4 0.6




subject. With this review, it is now possible to discuss
Game Theory content in VIC and GVS
.
2 . Game Theory in VIC
As presented, Game Theory included four elements-
players, alternatives, payoffs, and strategy. The presence
and form of each within VIC is as follows:
Players--the obvious choice for VIC ' s players are
the implied Blue Force and Red Force commanders. Of course
implicitly this includes all the constraints of each side's
National Command Authority and Policies.
Alternatives— the sets of Blue and Red alternatives
are not quite so obvious. These sets are not obvious
because they are infinite. While, at any given time, it is
true that both commanders have a finite number of units
available to them, these units can be sent anywhere, now or
at anytime in the future, to do anything. Thus, position,
time, and mission possibilities cause the alternative sets
to be infinite. VIC models these infinite alternative sets
using 143 actions. Before judging the adequacy of this
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number too harshly, recall that actions can be implemented
in combinations.
Payoffs—VIC has no explicit payoffs. When the
conditions are matched in a decision table column, the
actions in that column are executed. No comparisons are
made, so there is no use for payoff values. VIC's decision
strategy, discussed next, explains this lack and its
implications
.
Strategy--in this area, VIC makes some significant
simplifying assumptions. A complete player vs player payoff
matrix for VIC would have an infinite set of alternatives
for each player. VIC simplifies this by converting the
player vs player game (i.e., Blue vs Red), into a player vs
Nature game. This removes the enemy alternatives from the
game and introduces Nature's states.
Nature, in this case, is the battlefield situation,
including both Blue and Red forces. Unfortunately, the
state set is still infinite and a probability distribution
is now needed for Nature's states. VIC neatly sidesteps
both these problems. The state set is limited to the
current battlefield situation as definable by combinations
of the 238 conditions used in VIC. Thus, this current
situation or "real time" decision making limits the state
space to exactly one state. This is equivalent to assuming
away the uncertainty of nature.
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Once the current situation is matched in a VIC
decision table, the actions in that column are executed.
This implies that some payoff measure was used to determine
which actions are best for the matched situation. Within
the VIC documentation, two allusions to "tactical decision
rules" [Ref. 4:pp. 3,5] were the only references found which
might be related to such a payoff measure. Unfortunately,
no definition or listing of these "tactical decision rules"
was found during the course of this thesis. It is highly
probable that these rules are the model builders' attempt to
translate doctrine into the VIC model.
3. Game Theory in GVS
The presence and form of the four elements of Game
Theory within GVS are as follows:
Players—basically no different than VIC; these are
the Blue and Red commanders. A possible significant
advantage for GVS is its explicit representation of decision
making at various levels of command and the interactions
between those levels.
Alternatives—the infinite nature of the alternative
sets is the same in GVS as it was in VIC; the way they are
handled is not. This is discussed in the strategy section.
PayoffS--GVS has two payoff measures, the measures
of effectiveness discussed in A. 2. a. For the optimal
strategy of comparing all alternatives simultaneously, both
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measures of effectiveness are used. If more than one
alternative is feasible (i.e., first measure of
effectiveness), the alternative with the greatest difference
between the SIP curves (i.e., second measure of
effectiveness) is selected.
The sub-optimal decision strategy compares N
alternatives. Except for one case, this strategy also
requires both the feasibility measure of effectiveness and
the SIP curve difference measure of effectiveness. Only
simplest case of the sub-optimal strategy, when N=l, does
not require the SIP curve difference measure of
effectiveness, since the first feasible alternative is
implemented.
Strategy--Game Theory as illustrated so far has
dealt with only one measure of payoff. In a decision
situation, the desire to consider more than one measure of
payoff forces the commander into the realm of Multiattribute
Decision Theory. This aspect will be discussed in Section
C. For the purposes of Game Theory, the following
discussion illustrates that the GVS decision, though
Multiattribute in nature, is still using expected values to
make the decision.
Both the feasibility measure of effectiveness and
the SIP curve difference measure of effectiveness are
determined by the SIP curves presented in A.2.b, which are
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in turn determined by the entity's attribute data supplied
by the user. Presumably that data represents average
entities. Thus, the resulting measures of effectiveness are
the average (i.e., expected) measures of effectiveness and
the strategy being used is to select the maximum expected
measure of effectiveness alternative. The exception to this
is the simplest case of the sub-optimal strategy, when N=l
and one alternative is checked at a time until a feasibility
restoring alternative is found. In this case, the strategy
being used is "expected restoration of feasibility".
C. MULTIATTRIBUTE DECISION THEORY
1. General
The following definitions and descriptions are
abridged from a more detailed treatment found in Operation
Research Techniques for Management by Moskowitz and Wright
[Ref . 8] .
In general, during applications of simple Game
Theory, decisions are based on one payoff. However, the
results of decisions cannot always be narrowed down to one
payoff. This was pointed out in the discussion on GVS Game
strategy. In actual practice, decision results can be
measured by many different, and often conflicting, payoffs.
In Multiattribute Decision Theory these payoffs are called
attributes. In GVS discussions these have been called
"measures of effectiveness". Multiattribute decision making
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is the process of using more than one measure of
effectiveness to make a decision.
A multiattribute decision situation is composed of
three elements. First, the situation must have an overall
purpose. Secondly, there must be more than one alternative
available, all of which can fulfill the overall purpose.
Finally, an alternative's ability to achieve this overall
purpose must be describable by more than one attribute.
Given a situation as described above, two
intermediate steps may be required before decision models
can be considered. First, it may be necessary to
"decompose" the attributes until they are a measurable and
"sufficiently rich and meaningful set of descriptors to
capture the essence of the problem" [Ref. 8:p. 222].
Secondly, it is necessary to get the attribute data for each
alternative. TABLE A-8 is a procurement example of the
necessary attribute data.
Given the above attribute data, decision making
becomes a matter of processing the data in one of many
multiattribute decision models.
2. Models
Two models are of interest in this appendix. Both
are noncompensatory multiattribute decision models.
Noncompensatory means that "tradeoffs" between attributes
TABLE A-8. WIDGET ATTRIBUTES
Alternatives
:
Attributes: Widget A Widget B Widget C
Cost (Millions) 7 8 6
Schedule (Yrs) 2 1 3
Speed (MPH) 70 90 110
Vulnerability Average High Low
are not permitted. All comparisons are performed on an
attribute-by-attribute basis. These two models are
described below:
a. Disjunctive Satisficing Model
A satisficing model is one which partitions the
alternatives into acceptable or unacceptable categories
.
For a disjunctive satisficing model, a maximum value is
defined for each critical attribute. Any alternative whose
critical attributes meet or exceed these critical attribute
maximums is deemed acceptable. All others are eliminated.
b. Lexicographic Models
A lexicographic model requires that the
attributes be given a priority of importance. The
alternatives are then sorted by the value of the most
important alternative. If the top alternative is tied, then
a secondary sort on the second most important attribute is
81
performed. This continues until the top alternative is not
tied. This is the alternative of choice.
2. Multiattribute Decision Theory in VIC
During the Game Theory discussion of VIC, it was
pointed out that there is no explicit representation of
payoffs. This means there is also no explicit use of
multiattribute decision methods. However, if the "tactical
decision rules" mentioned in the VIC documentation [Ref
.
4:pp. 3,5] are the model builders' attempt to translate
doctrine into the VIC model, these rules may be roughly
analogous to a disjunctive satisf icing model. Doctrine
represents a minimum level to be attained in those attribute
areas deemed critical.
Decision tables implement this process as follows:
(1) attributes are deemed critical by their presence or
absence as decision table conditions; (2) answers/thresholds
in the columns of the decision table specify the minimum
acceptable levels of those critical attributes; and (3) the
decision table implements an action because it meets or
exceeds those minimum critical attribute levels.
For example, consider VIC Decision Table Dl
presented previously in Figure A-l. The conditions imply
that the critical attributes are whether the unit is first
echelon, whether the synchronization time at the last
location was met, and whether more than zero days have been
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simulated. The first column specifies yes, yes, and 0.0 as
the respective minimum acceptable levels. The presence of
the actions "attack" and "access Decision Table D5" in that
column means there exist tactical decision rules that say
"Given the above, attack!". Whether or not these tactical
decision rules explicitly exist, the decision tables imply
their existence.
3. Multiattribute Decision Theory in GVS
GVS uses two multiattribute decision methods. If
the optimal decision strategy of comparing all alternatives
was possible, the multiattribute decision method would be
the combination of a lexicographic model and a disjunctive
satisf icing model. The simplicity of this is not
immediately evident as all the eguations and parameters are
considered.
However, the equations and parameters are not a pari
of the decision process; they are the process by which the
different payoffs are determined. Once a set of sector SIP
curves are calculated for an alternative, the commander
first asks whether this alternative will make the sector
feasible. If more than one alternative is being evaluated
and more than one is feasible, then the commander decides
which one is better using the SIP curve difference measure
of effectiveness. The commander is using the sector SIP
curves to predict future situations. He does not make
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decisions from these predictions; rather, he generates
measures of effectiveness from them and then uses those to
make decisions. This future state prediction is discussed
later in Section D, Forecasting Theory.
The multiattribute decision process just described
is a lexicographic model. This is evident because two
measures of effectiveness are used: the feasibility measure
of effectiveness and the SIP curve difference measure of
effectiveness. The lexicographic model used specifies that
the alternatives be rank ordered first using the feasibility
payoff measure, then those alternatives still tied for first
place are rank ordered using the SIP curve difference
measure of effectiveness.
The rank ordering of the feasibility payoff measure
described in the lexicographic model is the application of a
disjunctive satisficing model. The critical attribute is
feasibility or inf easibility . The minimum acceptable level
of the payoff measure is feasibility.
In the sub-optimal decision strategy, in which N
alternatives are compared, the same combination of a
lexicographic model and a disjunctive satisficing model is
used, except for one case. That one case is N=l , in which
the first feasibility restoring alternative is implemented.
In the case where N=l , the model being used is the
truncated application of a disjunctive satisficing model.
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Since only one measure of effectiveness, feasibility, is
used, no lexicographic model is required. The application
of the disjunctive satisficing model is the same as when
N>1, except that the process is truncated before all
alternatives are divided into acceptable and unacceptable
classes. This truncation occurs as soon as the first
feasible alternative is found.
D. FORCASTING THEORY
This section differs from the preceding sections because
VIC's current time decision does not use forecasting. On
the other hand, GVS ' s use of the terms "time of prediction"
and "Predicted ABIP", together with GVS ' s end product--a set
of SIP curves for the commanders decision horizon--certainly
do imply forecasting. This section discusses GVS ' s use of
Forcasting Theory.
The definitions and descriptions on forecasting
contained in this section are abridged from a more detailed
treatment found in Interactive Forecasting by Makridakis and
Wheelwright [Ref. 9].
"The central theme of quantitative techniques of
forecasting is that the future can be predicted by
discovering the patterns of events in the past." [Ref. 9:p.
13] This statement identifies the two elements of Forecast
Theory: (1) data collected from the past; and (2) a method
to predict the future using that data. Before discussing
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either of these elements in detail, it is necessary to
understand "GVS ' s past and future" as it differs from GVS '
s
"forecasting past and future".
1 . GVS ' s Forcasting Past and Future
Suppose there exists a version of VIC with GVS
decision methodology instead of decision tables. Further,
suppose that this version is in the "middle" of simulating a
conflict. From the simulated commander's point of view, he
has not been storing and analyzing his loss data up to the
present time and then using that data to forecast his power
in the next battle. Thus, this commander's point of view is
a GVS past and future, not a forecast past and future. A
larger viewpoint is necessary to see the forecast past and
future
.
The forecast past and future are separated by the
point in time when data collection stops and predictions
begin. GVS ' s forecast past stopped and its future began as
soon as the above described model began execution. In
contrast, a GVS past and future was defined every time an
SIP curve was calculated during the course of the model.
With this understanding, the two elements of forecasting, as
applies to GVS, can be identified.
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2. Data Collection From GVS ' s Forcasting Past
a. An Ideal Situation
Consider the following ideal data collection
situation, in which the level of resolution is at an
absolute maximum. Everything on the battlefield is an
entity; be it man, "major-end-item" machine, or a spare
bolt. Also because this is an ideal situation, "loss data"
in the form of "entity type lost" and "time of loss" can be
collected. The number of remaining entities as a function
of time is the entity loss function.
In this ideal situation, GVS assigns each entity
type a specific power. Using the power values for each
entity type, the entity loss functions can be transformed
into entity "power loss functions", still functions of time.
Then, assuming that the sector power is the sum of the
individual entities' power, summing the entities' power loss
functions yields a sectcr power loss function.
This sector power loss function is analogous (as
are each of the entity loss functions and the entity power
loss functions) to the survival function used in reliability
studies. The sector starts at a certain power level and the
sector power loss function is the amount of power remaining
at time, t, from the start of the battle to the end of the
battle.
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The next ideal step is to gather data from every
possible combat scenario. Then, the best sector power loss
model for making predictions in future battles is the one
which best fits the sector power loss functions from these
scenarios. The model chosen will then determine what
parameters need to be calculated from the data.
b. A More Realistic Situation
Obviously, gathering such a wealth of data over
every possible combat scenario is impossible. Two questions
then become operative. First, how much data is required to
achieve a reasonable approximation? Secondly, where are
these data? The only way to answer the first question is
the scientific method—collect data, build a model, test the
model, and start over again if the model is not good enough.
The second question has three possibilities: (1) analysis
of historical data of real wars; (2) analysis of data from
real wargair.es; or (3) analysis of data from simulations.
3. A Model for GVS ' s Forcasting Future
Equations IV-7 and IV-8 presented in A.2.b represent
the GVS sector power loss model proposed in Kilmer's thesis
[Ref. 1] and used in the main body of this thesis. The
basic form of these equations imply an exponential decay of
power as a function of time. For entities not yet in
position to begin their assigned missions, the concept of
discounting power is added.
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As presented in the thesis main body, Equations
IV-7 and IV-8, together with their supporting equations also
presented in A.2.b, identify the following GVS parameters:
the entity attributes t Q , t p , tA , ABIP, PBA , and PAA . That
is, given data for these entity attributes, the entity's SIP
curve can be calculated. The first three parameters are,
except for the entity attributes of location and movement
rate, scenario determined. The second three require
extensive data collection and analysis.
Equation IV-1 presented in A.2.b stated that
ABIP is a function of BIP and S. BIPs are subjectively
assigned to entities in some consistent manner. They are
conceptually similar to "tank entity equivalents". The
vector of entity attributes, S, are those attributes which
the model monitors. The task of determining a function for
ABIP was addressed by Crawford [Ref. 6]. His model
determined ABIP as a function of the percent levels of on-
hand personnel, vehicles, ammunition, and POL. Crawford's
use of a subjective survey of Army officers illustrates
that, like BIP, ABIP is also subjective in nature.
The determination of PBA and PAA from real world
data has not been addressed at this time. Equations VI-5
and VI-6 presented in A.2.b probably represent the minimum
level of complexity required. The ideal situation described
in D.2.a represents the unapproachable maximum level of
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complexity. Somewhere between the two lies a level of
complexity that will produce an acceptable approximation;
perhaps it can be based on personnel, vehicles, ammunition,
and POL as Crawford [Ref. 6] used for ABIP.
E. UTILITY THEORY
1. General
The following definitions and descriptions are
abridged from a more detailed treatment found in Operation
Research Techniques for Management by Moskowitz and Wright
[Ref. 8]
.
Classical Utility Theory is required when decisions
are made under conditions of risk. A variation on classical
Utility Theory is when two things are so qualitatively
different that they cannot be compared directly (i.e., the
better of two is not readily determinable) . In both of
these situations, the decision maker is required to make
subjective evaluations.
The usual example of the risk situation is a
lottery. The basic question is something like "How much
money would you be willing to pay to engage in (or to avoid)
a lottery with a probability P of winning X dollars and a
probability 1-P of losing Y dollars?". The quantity being
measured by such a question is the subjective amount of risk
the decision maker is willing to tolerate.
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By asking many such very carefully worded questions,
the decision makers "utility function" can be determined.
Such a utility function can be used to quantify the utility,
or usefulness, of the decision maker's alternatives as a
function of their affect on his total assets.
A good example of the comparison situation can be
found in combat modeling. The question posed to the
commander would be something like "Given a specific tactical
situation, how many infantry companies would you be willing
give up for one tank company?". The quantity being measured
by such a question is the subjective usefulness of an
infantry company as compared to a tank company.
Again, by asking many such very carefully worded
questions, the "relative" utility of all entity types can be
found. The word "relative" is used because there is no
absolute scale; a "reference entity" must be defined and all
other entities quantitatively compared to that entity.
These quantitative comparisons could then be mapped onto a.
measurement scale. As with the situation with risk, such a
measurement scale quantifies the utility, or usefulness, of
the entity types to the commander as a function of his
current force mix of entities and the given situation. The
situation is included because entity usefulness can vary
greatly with the situation; for example, tanks are not very
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useful in swamps nor is straight leg infantry very useful in
the open desert.
2. Utility Theory in VIC
As with the payoffs discussed earlier, VIC's use of
Utility Theory is implicit, if at all. It has be suggested
that VIC's decision tables are based on tactical decision
rules, which are in turn based on doctrine. Doctrine, by
its very nature, is the subjective expert opinion of how to
wage war. That subjective expert opinion will necessarily
be making comparisons of the type described in the variation
on Utility Theory described above.
3. Utility Theory in GVS
GVS ' s use of Utility Theory is the same as VIC's;
however, GVS ' s use is explicit. It was mentioned previously
that BIPs are subjectively assigned to entities in some
consistent manner. This consistent manner is exactly as
described above in the variation on Utility Theory. Such an
effort would probably make a good thesis topic.
Another area, similar to BIP, which also reguires
subjective evaluation is the function for ABIP (Equation IV-
1). As previously mentioned, Crawford [Ref. 6] used a
subjective survey of Army officers to establish ABIP as a
function of personnel, vehicles, ammunition, and POL. This
effort is another application of the variation on Utility
Theory described above. In this case the comparisons being
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made are between entities which differ only on the on-hand
levels of personnel, vehicles, ammunition, and POL.
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APPENDIX B
DECISION TABLE EXAMINATION RESULTS
A. NOTES ON FORMAT
--Relevant conditions are listed for each special
munition (s) considered by the decision table.
—NONE is used to list conditions where current tables
preclude special munitions.
--Each relevant condition's answer/threshold value is in
parentheses after the condition.
--Conditions can be either explicit to the table or
implied by the table's resulting action(s).
B . RESULTS
1. Table Dl
No modifications necessary since this table's only
actions always include accessing Table D2 or Table D5, and
their modifications will suffice.
2. Table D2
a. Relevant Conditions:
NONE C74 (Y) , C75 (3.), and C203 (5)?
NONE C409 (Y) , C411 (Y) , C412 (Y) , or C413 (Y)
?









NONE C409 (Y) , C411 (Y) , C412 (Y) , or C413 (Y)?
b. Modifications:
- Change A54 to A70G, "X"s in columns 1 thru 3.
4. Table D4
a. Relevant Conditions:
NONE C74 (Y) , C75 (3.), and C203 (5)?
NONE C409 (Y) , C411 (Y) , C412 (Y) , or C413 (Y) ?
A57 C403 (Y) , C404 (Y) , or C405 (Y) ?
b. Modifications:









- Add A700, "X"s in columns 1 and 3.
6. Table D7
a. Relevant Conditions:
NONE C74 (Y) , C75 (3.), and C203 (5)?
NONE C409 (Y) , C411 (Y) , C412 (Y) , or C413 (Y)
?
A55 CI (Y)?




- Change A55 to A700, "X"s in columns 3 thru 8.
7. Table D7 .
5
a. Relevant Conditions:




- Change A54 and A55 to A700, "X"s in columns 1 thru 3.
8. Table D9
a. Relevant Conditions:
NONE C406 (Y) , C410 (Y) , or C414 (Y)
?
b. Modifications:
- Add A700, "X"s in columns 1 thru 4.
9. Table D10
a. Relevant Conditions:
NONE CI (Y) , C403 (Y) , or C405 (Y)
?
NONE C409 (Y) , C411 (Y) , C412 (Y) , or C413 (Y)
?
b. Modifications:
- Add A700, "X"s in columns 2 thru 4.
10. Table Dll
a. Relevant Conditions:
A55 CI (Y) or C19 (Y)
?
b. Modifications:
- Add A700, "X"s in columns 1 and 2.
11. Table D12
a. Relevant Conditions:
A55 CI (Y) or C402 (Y)
?
b. Modifications:






- Change A58 to A700, with "X" in column 1.
13. Table D17
a. Relevant Conditions:
A57 C19 (Y) , C58 (15), and C613 (Y) ?
b. Modifications:
- Change A57 to A700, with "X" in column 1.
14. Table D21
a. Relevant Conditions:
A55 CI (Y) or C402 (Y)
?
b. Modifications:





- Change A55 to A700, "X"s in columns 1 thru 4.
16. Table D42
a. Relevant Conditions:
A55 C403 (Y) or C405 (Y)
?
A54 C414 (Y)?








NONE C409 (Y) , C411 (Y) , C412 (Y) , or C413 (Y)
?
b. Modifications:
- Change A54 to A700, "X"s in columns 1 thru 5.
18. Table D44
a. Relevant Conditions:
A57 C403 (Y) , C404 (Y) , or C405?
NONE C409 (Y) , C411 (Y) , C412 (Y) , or C413 (Y)
b. Modifications:
- Change A57 to A700, "X"s in columns 1 thru 5.
19. Table D45
a. Relevant Conditions:
NONE CI (Y) , C403 (Y) , C405 (Y) , or C414 (Y)
?
b. Modifications:
- Add A700, "X"s in columns 2 and 3.
20. Table D46
a. Relevant Conditions:
NONE CI (Y) , C403 (Y) , or C405 (Y)
?
NONE C409 (Y) , C411 (Y) , C412 (Y) , or C413 (Y)
b. Modifications:






- Change A55 to A700, "X"s in columns 1 and 2.
22. Table D48
a. Relevant Conditions:
A55 CI (Y) or C402 (Y)
?
b. Modifications:
- Change A55 to A700, "X"s in columns 1 thru 4.
23. Table D49
a. Relevant Conditions:
NONE C74 (Y) , C75 (3.), and C203 (5)?
NONE C409 (Y) , C411 (Y) , C412 (Y) , or C413 (Y)
A55 CI (Y) , C403 (Y) , C404 (Y) , C405 (Y) , or
C410 (Y)?
b. Modifications:











- Change A57 to A700, with "X" in column 1.
26. Table D54
a. Relevant Conditions:
NONE C406 (Y) , C410 (Y) , or C414 (Y)
?
b. Modifications:




NONE C409 (Y) , C411 (Y) , C412 (Y) , or C413 (Y)
?








A54 CI (Y) and C414 (Y)
NONE C409 (Y) , C411 (Y) , C412 (Y) , or C413 (Y)
b. Modifications:
- Change A54 to A700, with "X" in column 2.
29. Table D104
a. Relevant Conditions:
NONE C403 (Y) , C404 (Y) , C405 (Y) , C409 (Y)
,
C411 (Y) , C412 (Y) , or C413 (Y)
?
b. Modifications:




NONE C4G3 (Y) , C405 (Y) , C414 (Y)
b. Modifications:
- Add A700, "X"s in columns 1 and 3.
31. Table D106
a. Relevant Conditions:
A54 CI (Y) and C414 (Y)
?
A56 CI (Y) and C414 (Y)
NONE not CI (Y) and C414 (Y)
NONE C409 (Y) , C411 (Y), C412 (Y) , or C413 (Y)
?
b. Modifications:
- Combine A54 & A56 to A700, "X"s in columns 1 thru 7
32. Table D107
a. Relevant Conditions:
NONE C409 (Y) , C411 (Y), C412 (Y) , or C413 (Y)
NONE C403 (Y) , C404 (Y) , C405 (Y) , or C410 (Y)
b. Modifications:
- Add A70C, "X"s in columns 1 thru 5.
33. Table D109
a. Relevant Conditions:
NONE CI (Y) , C10 (1.5)
b. Modifications:
- Add A700, "X"s in columns 1 thru 4.
34. Table D110
a. Relevant Conditions:
NONE C37 (Y) and C415 (Y)
A54 CI (Y) and C414 (Y)
100
A56 CI (Y) and C414 (Y)
NONE C409 (Y) , C411 (Y) , C412 (Y) , or C413 (Y)
?
b. Modifications:
- Combine A54 & A56 to A700, "X"s in columns 1 thru 9.
35. Table Dl17
a. Relevant Conditions:
A57 No X in any column.
A55 CI (Y) and C403 (Y) or C405 (Y) ?
b. Modifications:
- Combine A55 & A57 to A700, "X"s in columns 1 thru 8,





If either side has used chemicals and the other does not
yet have chemical release, chemical release is requested.
The action "REQUEST CHEMICAL RELEASE" can be an automatic
release or can be an algorithm that tests whether using
side's use of chemical has reached an established "chemicals
free threshold" (e.g. the number of chemical attacks in the
last 48 hours). If the threshold is reached, release should
be scheduled to occur according to a reasonable estimate of
the length of time it would take the request to go from the
requestor to the command level which makes that decision and
back to the requestor. An embellishment would be to have
command level establish a release window rather than just a
release. Another possible embellishment would be to modify
the special munition decision table to revoke the release
when one side's use of chemical falls below a similarly
established "chemicals tight threshold". Note that the




This situation allows only the leading unit to request
special munitions.
C. SITUATIONS 3, 4, & 5
These three situations have the same theme, approaching
enemy reinforcements. The idea is to delay and degrade. To
this end, all three request FASCAM. In addition, if the
requesting unit is in MOPP 3 or 4 , has chemical release, and
the target unit is in a lessor MOPP level, then a chemical
attack is requested. A further distinction is made to
employ a persistent agent if the requesting unit is on the
defensive (i.e., no forward movement). An embellishment
would be to use persistent only if the requesting unit was
going to be on the defensive for a length of time greater
than the agent duration time. Note that the decision table




This situation allows only standard munitions to
employed when the opposing forces are less than 300 meters
apart. The implication is that there is no advantage to
using special munitions in such close combat situations.
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E. SITUATION 7 & 8
These situations have the requesting unit withdrawing
opposed within direct fire weapon range. Requests for self
screening smoke and self protecting FASCAM are made. In
addition, situation 8 requests a persistent chemical attack
if the requestor is in MOPP 3 or 4 , the target unit is not,
and the requestor has chemical release.
F. SITUATION 9 & 10
These situations have the requesting unit defending and
not withdrawing opposed, within direct fire weapon range.
Request for self protecting FASCAM is made. In addition,
situation 10 requests a persistent chemical attack if the
requestor is in MOPP 3 or 4 , the target unit is not, and th<
requestor has chemical release. Smoke is specifically not
requested because it would degrade the requesting unit's
ability to employ direct fire weapons.
G. SITUATION 11 & 12
These situations have the requesting unit in pursuit of
withdrawing target forces within direct fire weapons range.
Requests for enemy blocking FASCAM and self screening smoke
are made. In addition, situation 12 requests a non-
persistent chemical attack if the requestor is in MOPP 3 or
4, the target unit is not, and the requestor has chemical
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release. Smoke is requested to reduce pursuing forces
vulnerability.
H. SITUATION 13 & 14
These situations have the requesting unit on the
offensive within direct fire weapons range. Request for
enemy screening smoke is made. In addition, situation 14
requests a non-persistent chemical attack if the requestor
is in MOPP 3 or 4 , the target unit is not, and the requestor
has chemical release. Smoke is requested to reduce the
requestor's vulnerability while moving forward.
I. SITUATION 15 & 16
These situations are identical to situations 7 & 8,
except the requestor is beyond direct fire weapons range.
Requests are also identical. This makes these two columns
redundant; they were included because this decision table is
a direct translation of the flow chart in Figure III-3 (see
Section III of the thesis main body)
.
J. SITUATION 17 & 18
These situations are identical to situations 9 & 10,
except the requestor is beyond direct fire weapons range.
Actions differ in that an additional request is made for
enemy screening smoke. The intent is to keep the target
unit screened from seeing the requestor (in his defensive
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positions) until the target unit has moved into direct fire
weapons range.
K. SITUATION 19 & 20
These situations are identical to situations 11 & 12,
except the requestor is beyond direct fire weapons range.
Requests are also identical. This makes these two columns
redundant; they were included because this decision table is
a direct translation of the flow chart in Figure III-3 (see
Section III of the thesis main body)
.
L. SITUATION 21 & 22
These situations are identical to situations 13 & 14,
except the requestor is beyond direct fire weapons range.
Requests are also identical. This makes these two columns
redundant; they were included because this decision table is
a direct translation of the flow chart in Figure III-3 (see
Section III of the thesis main body)
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